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Migration from Muslim Countries and the "New Antisemitism"

An Examination into a Potential Source of Rising Antisemitic Incidents

Thesis paper for M.A. in Public Policy

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Abstract

This study begins by building a historical and conceptual framework for studying antisemitism and its origins and then discusses a number of potential causal factors influencing fluctuations in antisemitic incidents, and comparing them to hate crimes. We then conduct an OLS panel analysis examining the relationship between growing numbers of Muslim-origin migrants in OECD member states, and a rise in antisemitic incidents in the states absorbing them. The analysis is based on a unique data set, derived from governments and NGOs, of 10 countries with figures on antisemitic incidents and migration over the course of 15 years, while controlling for economic, political and Israel-related variables.

We find that migrants from Muslim countries are positively correlated with subsequent antisemitic incidents, especially in Europe. These findings are robust for alternative measures of both migrants and incidents. Meanwhile, migrants from non-Muslim countries are not correlated to future antisemitic incidents, but rather to future non-antisemitic hate crimes. Additionally, Muslim migration under right-wing governments has a positive relationship with antisemitic incidents.

Overall, our analysis provides preliminary empirical support that growing numbers of Muslim migrants in OECD countries can be linked with rising levels of antisemitic incidents.

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Table of Contents

Introduction

Antisemitism – bigotry targeting Jews – is a phenomenon with a long history. Today, with a growing awareness in the developed world to hate crimes and tolerance-related issues, ongoing demographic changes and economic shifts, as well as the high profile of religious extremism and the enduring conflicts in the Middle East, there is a rising consciousness and understanding of this form of prejudice. A growing trend of antisemitic violence across Europe, in addition to a concurrent rise in overall Jewish emigration rates to Israel and other countries, has led to discussions on "the future of Jewish communities in Europe" (Porat, 2016; European Parliament News, 2016; Goldberg, 2015a; Liebermann, 2016). As officials such as former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have spoken out against the trends while increasing funding to secure Jewish institutions and communities, the question remains: what are the major factors affecting antisemitic sentiment and activity in the world today? (AFP, 2015; Goldberg, 2015b).

This study provides a historical and conceptual view of antisemitism, and subsequently reviews economic, political, religious and demographic theories on hate crimes and antisemitism. It covers the development of modern ideas of a "new antisemitism" and the rise of this phenomenon around the world and especially in developed, OECD countries. A special examination is then conducted into a potential relationship between increased Muslim migration to Western countries and the perceived rise in antisemitic incidents.

After a basic examination of factors potentially influencing a rise in antisemitic incidents and the relationship between the latter and hate crimes in general, we conduct a series of regressions testing the relationship between rising Muslim migration and antisemitic incidents in a sample of 10 OECD countries between the years 2001-2015. The chief independent variable of migration from Muslim countries, chosen for its topicality and relevance to current events, is accompanied by covariates that express additional potentially

influencing factors in the economic, political and public-diplomacy spheres. The information was gathered from countries in which such incidents are recorded annually, either officially or though nongovernmental organizations.

The goal of this study is to provide an effective basic overview of the phenomenon of antisemitism and its development throughout the millennia, to give a picture of the current situation and trends and to examine antisemitic incidents as a subset of hate crimes, and finally to test a potentially decisive factor influencing a rise in antisemitic incidents.

Although reports and studies covering antisemitic incidents in individual countries and even regions do exist, there is a clear lack of studies that aggregate data collection on the topic from multiple regions and attempt to determine a more global perspective for describing this worrying phenomenon. This study attempts to provide an an initial step towards the development of such a global perspective.

Defining Antisemitism

The term "antisemitism" was initially coined in the late 19th Century by German publicist Wilhelm Marr as a way of referring to the "non-confessional" hatred of Jews and Judaism (Wistrich, 1991, xv). Over time, the term has become accepted to mean the hostility towards Jewish people and Judaism in all its forms – religious, social, economic, political and racial (Ibid., xvi).

As a matter of policy, some state and non-state bodies continue to have varying or unclear interpretations of the how to categorize antisemitic attitudes and actions. This study uses as a basis the "Working Definition of Antisemitism", also known as the "International Definition of Antisemitism", as drafted by the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and

Xenophobia (EUMC) in 2005.[1] The EUMC working definition is a one-page document which begins with the basic definition as follows:

> "Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities" (Working definition of Antisemitism).

The document continues with examples of actions that could be considered antisemitic, including traditional examples of antisemitic stereotypes and beliefs, as well as demonization and delegitimization of the State of Israel, with the latter seen as a "Jewish collectivity" (Ibid.).

Although taken down from the website of the EUMC's successor organization, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), in 2013, the working definition has been adopted as a standard definition for antisemitism by, among others: the European Parliament; the governments of the United Kingdom, Austria and Germany; the United States Department of State and US Senate; and the 31 countries that make up the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (Campaign Against Antisemitism Website).

An additional note will be made here. The spelling of the term used in this study is "antisemitism" and not "anti-Semitism". A number of scholars argue that the use of the hyphenated and capitalized term generalizes the word past its specific meaning, which exclusively indicates hostility towards Jews. "Semitism" itself does not exist as an objective ideology or condition, and neither should the term antisemitism be confused with hatred of all "Semitic" peoples, as that is neither historically nor currently the meaning of the term (Berenbaum, 2008, 93).

[1] For this study, the Working Definition on Antisemitism was chosen after consultation and advice from Dr. Haim Fireberg, Director of Research at the Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University.

Historical Review – Discussing the Roots of Antisemitism

Before touching upon theories and explanations of the "new antisemitism", we will first go through a short background to provide a historical context for antisemitism as a whole. The history of antisemitism is multifaceted, drawing on the interaction between Jews and other peoples with whom they came into contact. The various classifications of this phenomenon that we are now able to name stem from a long experience dating back thousands of years, though its origins are not always clear. A brief history of antisemitism and some of its major turning points and evolutions appears below.

Seeing to the phenomenon's long history, some scholars have positioned antisemitism as an almost inseparable component of Jewish existence, claiming that it has continuously influenced Jews in a way that has perpetuated the community's cohesion and its formation of narratives (Cohn-Sherbok, 2006, xii). In his seminal work on the subject, French existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre claimed that the Jew only exists due to a condition which has been forced upon him by the antisemite (Sartre, 1995 edition). While these positions may be controversial, they provide an image of the extent to which antisemitism has been a part of the Jewish experience and hint at its pervasive nature.

The first mention of anti-Jewish animus appears in Jewish texts themselves, in the Hebrew story of the Exodus from Egypt, in which Pharaoh persecutes the Children of Israel, fearing their growing numbers and potential disloyalty to Egypt (Cohn-Sherbok, 124). In modern terminology, this fear of foreigners may be described as a form of nativism or xenophobia.

The Book of Esther introduces antisemitism in a similar context to how it has been experienced in diaspora Jewish life in recent millennia. In the story, dated to approximately the fifth century BCE, Jews are viewed with disdain by Haman, advisor of King Ahasuerus of Persia, who plans a genocide to rid the kingdom of this bothersome people (Ibid., 134-36).

Haman's fixation on the Jewish minority – seen as the "other" in the Persian setting of the story – and his desire to purge society of this minority, is a recurring theme that can be seen in historic incidents throughout Jewish history.

Outside of the Jewish tradition and texts, there exist relatively few examples of anti-Jewish sentiment among other peoples in antiquity, especially in the form of popular and collective reactions against Jews (Poliakov, 1965, 11). At the same time, written accusations against Jews of ritual cannibalism – amounting to an early version of the antisemitic blood libel – have been found within Hellenistic kingdoms and societies in the first and second centuries BCE (Perry and Schweitzer, 2008, 46-47). Additionally, there exist a number of hostile texts by Greek and Roman authors between the the first century BCE and second century CE that denounce the supposed exclusivity and seclusion of the Jewish populations of the day (Poliakov, 4, 12).

With the advent of Christianity and the interaction between Christians and Jews, antisemitism underwent further evolutions. In its early years, lacking broad political power, Christianity saw itself as a sister religion in competition with Judaism. This perspective eventually gave way to the idea of supersession – seeing Jews as belonging to an outdated belief system which had been made irrelevant, and turning them into enemies of the faith (Carrol, 2002, 58-60).

The rise of Christian antisemitism was strengthened with the increase of the religion's influence and power. Emperor Constantine's adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire in 324 CE marked a turning point, leading to theological shifts and a codification of the religion that widely came to see Jews as killers of Christ and the enemies of believing Christians (Ibid., 191).

These events formed the basis for the next millennium and a half of Christian attitudes towards Jews. Throughout Medieval Christian Europe, antisemitic imagery and myths became

widespread as Jews were seen both as deliberate unbelievers collaborating with the devil and also stereotyped "as usurers, bribers, secret killers, sorcerers, magicians and oppressors of the poor" (Wistrich, 1991, 29).

Christian Europe's antisemitism was also expressed through actions: from the massacres of Jewish communities during the Crusades starting in 1096, to the papal decree calling for Jews to wear distinctive clothing in 1215, to periodic burning of Jewish texts, to scapegoating Jews for the bubonic plague and society's ills, to the Inquisition and expulsion from Spain in 1492, to additional massacres and expulsions throughout much of Europe – the Christian world created a historic continuum of antisemitic expression (Poliakov, 41-46, 64, 70, 72, 102-103, 109; Wistrich, 28, 36; Perry and Schweitzer, 74, 79-80).

The origins of racial antisemitism have been traced back to the period of the Spanish Inquisition in the 15th century, during which the limpieza de sangre ("purity of blood") laws began to be enforced (Gorsky, 2015, 329-338). These edicts specifically targeted conversos – those Jews who had converted to Christianity and were living their lives as "New Christians". Legal discrimination and denial of rights were codified against all conversos who could not prove four full generations of Christian affiliation – instituting a system of racial persecution which continued to be used in later years against Jews, as well as other groups in the New World through the "one-drop" blood rule (Ibid., 176-79).[2]

Christian antisemitism did not subside with the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century. After Jewish communities refused to follow reformer Martin Luther and convert to Christianity, he published the infamous antisemitic tractate *On the Jews and Their Lies*. This treatise attacked Jews for their foreign origins, their greed and their deception, calling them "children of the devil" and encouraging their persecution and murder (Luther, annotated edition

[2] See also: Netanyahu, B., (1995), *The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth Century Spain*. New York: Random House.

from 2015). Luther's tirades against Jews played an important role in the development of later antisemitic German nationalist ideas, and hundreds of years later his writing was adopted for propaganda purposes by the Nazis (Gritsch, 2012, 111-120).

Meanwhile, with the advent of Islam in the seventh century, Jews came into contact with another budding civilization and religious tradition stemming in part from their own. While some Jewish communities of Arabia had prompted the Prophet Muhammad's anger by refusing to follow him in the early days of Islam, Muslim theology did not attribute the same level of contempt towards Jews as did Christianity (Schoenfeld, 2004, 32). The protected status of Jews as a "People of the Book" who nevertheless rejected Islam differed greatly from the Christian charges of deicide. Nevertheless, in subsequent periods the stance of Muslim supersession and the contempt for the Jewish dismissal of Islam provided a comfortable justification for antisemitic contempt (Laqueur, 2006, 36-37).

Although overall, the situation for Jews in the Muslim and Arab world was more tolerant than in Christian Europe, the coexistence was occasionally interrupted by periods of strife and conflict (Wistrich, 196). In the early days of Islam, conspiracy theories existed describing Jewish efforts to tear apart Muslim unity in an attempt at destroying the new community (Nettler, 1990, 78-83). Additionally, contempt for the economic success of Jews periodically caused trouble, including waves of persecution in the 10th-11th centuries (Wistrich, 197-8).

By and large, however, through the 19th century most of the extreme antisemitic positions held against the Jewish minority in the Muslim world were not homegrown, but rather imported from Europe (Schoenfeld, 2004, 7).[3]

The European Enlightenment brought with it an evolution of antisemitism, which

[3] Further discussion of the theoretical framework of Muslim antisemitism, including its more modern expressions, will be presented in the antisemitism literature review later in this study.

adopted more sophisticated rationalizations that took the emphasis off of the theological Christian accusations against Jews and instead turned against the Jews as "obstacles to human progress" due to their archaic beliefs and practices (Wistrich, 45). Different ideological movements found diverse ways of attacking Jewish existence: from the freethinkers condemning Jewish cultural conservatism, to socialists denouncing Jewish capitalism, to European nationalists despising Jewish foreignness and cultural conservatives deploring the supposed Jewish penchant for societal subversion (Ibid., 53).

While for centuries, the vast majority of Jews in Europe lived in strictly segregated communities and ghettoes as non-citizens without rights, a process of emancipation began gradually in the 18th century and continued well into the 20th (Battenberg, 2017; Volovici, 2017). During this period, Jews were gradually given civil rights in a number of Western European countries, allowing them to begin living under legal equality in their countries of residence. However, this legal emancipation was not accompanied by social integration, and the entrance of the newly "equal", but still "separate", Jew into society led to the development of newer forms of antisemitic ideology (Battenberg, 2017).

Modernization has been postulated as a key player in the rise of modern antisemitism in Europe during this time period. As Jews began entering society and succeeding, this elicited feelings of jealousy and fear among non-Jews (Brustein and King, 2004, 36-37). Additionally, Jewish involvement in a number of left-wing political movements of the day caused resentment among European conservatives and traditionalists, also fueling antisemitic sentiment (Ibid., 47).

Political fear of Jews gained support from Russia, where, after centuries of czar-enforced segregation and pogroms that kept many Jews living in fear of their neighbors and of the authorities, radical political movements began growing within the Jewish community in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Johnson, 2003). Jewish involvement in both revolutionary

anti-czar activity, as well as the growing Zionist movement, led to the publication in 1901 of the infamous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, an antisemitic tract said to have been forged by the Russian secret police and claiming a secret Jewish conspiracy to take control of the world (Ibid.).

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as industry boomed and political social upheaval swept through much of the Western world, pseudo-scientific ideas about race became popular, leading to the development of racial theories and justifications for an antisemitism based on biology (Lindemann, 1997). In many European societies, Jewish "otherness" was now seen as stemming from a deep-seated racial difference which had little to do with previous religious biases. This marked a further sub-evolution of the phenomenon.

As nationalism increased and came to be a major component of the identities of most European nations, Jews were often viewed with increased suspicion and highlighted as an alien and subversive force among the peoples of Europe, even as they were simultaneously enjoying increased rights and success (Almog, 1990). As European ethnic nationalism developed new ideas about the purposes and structure of the political community, Jews were excluded and sometimes seen as outright enemies, a sentiment that led to the rise of genocidal antisemitic discourse (Fine, 2010).

In the period leading up to World War 2 and the Holocaust, antisemitic policies were regaining popularity not only in Germany, but throughout both Western and Eastern Europe, and they gained expression both in top-down political decisions and in popular sentiment, riots and assaults (Brustein, 2003, 3-5). Eventually, out of the nationalist movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries grew extreme ideologies, such as fascism and Nazism, which included radical and violent responses to modernity and posited Jews as the ultimate enemy (Nolte, 1966).

As part of this evolution, Nazi leader Adolf Hitler combined the racist, xenophobic,

economic, antimodernist and "Enlightenment" streams within the antisemitism of his time and turned the defeat of the Jews into a "universal task" which went past particularistic national concerns, into something necessary for the salvation of all mankind (Bacharach, 1998).

The resulting murder of 6 million Jews in the Holocaust may have been the deadly historic climax of antisemitism; however, this phenomenon did not disappear and, as we will see in the forthcoming literature reviews, today's antisemitism is driven by a diverse set of potential causal factors and ideologies.

The above summary – a modest contribution – helps to provide the historic context and helps bring us to the theoretical literature reviews necessary for a study that explores the potential causal factors behind antisemitic acts and incidents. The historical review ends at the Holocaust not because that point signifies the end of antisemitism, but rather because it serves as a kind of border between historic manifestations of antisemitism and the current situation, as it has developed since the second half of the 20th century.

After examining literature on hate crimes in order to focus our study on the hate-motivated incidents being perpetrated against Jews and others around the world, we will present a literature review proposing a number of theories to explain the perpetration of antisemitic acts in today's world. We will subsequently present a quantitative analysis of one such theory and attempt to test support for its existence.

Literature Review on Hate Crimes

What is hate crime:

Antisemitic incidents in this study will be analyzed beginning with theories that describe hate crimes in general. In looking for a standardized legal perspective on hate crime, Frederick M. Lawrence (1994) argues for the racial animus model of bias crimes – defining them on the basis of the perpetrator's animus toward the victim's group "and the centrality of this animus in the perpetrator's motivation for committing the crime" (324). These crimes often have a higher tendency to be violent than other, "parallel" crimes; they are more likely to involve strangers; and they are more likely to lead to a high sense of vulnerability on the part of the victim (Ibid., 342-43).

Hate crime can be aimed at a variety of different target groups and can include violence, but also destruction of property, harassment, trespassing and other criminal behavior (Green, McFalls and Smith, 2001). Definitions of hate crime often denote the relevant groups targeted, the type of unlawful activity and the kinds of motivation applicable to the crime (Ibid.). As antisemitic incidents are a subset of these categories of hate crimes, we will see that they, too, are defined in various ways depending on the country in question.

Motivating factors:

Other than being commonly male, there seems to be no discernable profile of a typical offender when speaking of hate crimes, and research shows that offenders often come from diverse racial or ethnic backgrounds, with little in common (Craig, 2002). Similarly, the offender's bias motivation has been described as a "multidimensional construct", without one clear psychological or social factor influencing a particular offender (Dunbar, 2003).

With regard to hate groups, Dunbar's (2003) examination of hate crime perpetrators in Los Angeles found that a minority (fewer than 14%) belonged to hate groups on the eve of the

crime. According to Levin's (2002) analysis of hate crime in the United States, only 5% of all such crimes were committed by members of hate groups. Additionally, statistical analyses have found with regards to hate groups that historical circumstances and particularities are more responsible for the existence of such groups in a specific locale than are observable economic, societal or demographic indicators (Jefferson and Pryor, 1999).

Based on the above evidence, analyzing the presence of hate groups is not particularly necessary for examining factors that may lead to hate crimes, including antisemitic incidents.

Economics:

Early research testing the effect of economic conditions on what is now understood as hate crime was conducted by Raper (1933), who studied the lynching of African-Americans in the southern United States and found a negative correlation between those figures and the rising and falling price of cotton – which represented the general economic situation of the time. Despite obvious methodological flaws with regards to correlation vs. causation, Raper's conclusion claimed to have found an economic causation for what would later be known as "hate crimes", and it formed a basis for the subsequent study of economic motives for bias-motivated and other crimes.

A number of later studies reexamined Raper's primitive research technique and determined alternative results, most notably Green, Glaser and Rich (1998). Green et. al. reviewed the data on lynchings, extended the time-series analysis through the Great Depression, and applied a similar technique to contemporary data. Their work rejected the link between economic performance and intolerant activity against minorities and found no connection between unemployment and hate crimes.

An "envy" model for hate crime was developed by Gale, Heath and Ressler (2002). Using Becker's (1981) analysis of altruism and the family – which posited that envious

behavior causes conflict – Gale et. al. found consistency between hate crime and envious behavior. First, they distinguished hate crime from parallel crimes: whereas in an ordinary crime, the perpetrator is motivated by personal gain and does not necessarily have any direct, specific ill will towards the victim, a hate crime is different because the perpetrator specifically wants to cause harm as a result of ill will or hatred directed at the victim. Analyzing hate crimes in the US, their analysis used relative income between white and black residents of neighborhoods as a proxy for envy and found that as the wage gap between blacks and whites in a neighborhood closes, the rate of hate crime in that neighborhood increases.

Following the idea of envy, Levin and McDevitt (2008) posited that the incidence of hate crimes particularly seems to rise when one group in society starts to feel that its position of privilege is being threatened by another group. "This was true in Nazi Germany; it was also true in the United States during Reconstruction, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the civil rights movement of the 1960s" (Ibid., 20). These models based on envy and a feeling of threat may contribute to an economic analysis of the factors influencing antisemitic incidents.

A number of studies have found additional economic links for the incidence of hate crimes. Medoff (1999) found that hate crimes are positively related to the unemployment rate and negatively related to the market wage rate, meaning that as employment and wages rise, there will be fewer hate crimes. Medoff explained unemployment's effects with a "rational-choice approach", concluding that a rise in the unemployment rate lowers the opportunity cost of time for many individuals, thus allowing them to engage in more "time-intensive hateful activity" (Medoff, 1999, 970).

Ryan and Leeson (2010) gave an additional push to the economic argument with their study of hate crime in the US, which emerged with a statistically significant conclusion that states with higher unemployment rates have more hate crime. Gale, Heath and Ressler (2002) also determined a positive relationship between unemployment and hate crime. Conversely,

using gross national product (GNP) as an indicator for overall economic level, Green, McFalls and Smith (2001) found a positive correlation, meaning that a higher *macroeconomic* level may lead to more hate crimes.

A consistent association between greater urbanization and higher rates of hate crime has been found in studies of the US and western Germany (Ryan and Leeson, 2010; Krueger and Pischke, 1997). As Jews tend to live in higher concentrations in cities, this may inform trends in antisemitic incidents in recent years.

Demographics have been examined as potential influencing factors for hate crimes. Green et. al. (1998) found a link to demographic changes in the US – concluding that as black migration into white neighborhoods decreases, so does the incidence of hate crimes. Gale, Heath and Ressler (2002) found a positive link between hate crimes and Jewish population, meaning that states with a higher percentage of Jewish residents were likely to have higher rates of hate crime. In the context of studying antisemitic incidents, this could be taken into account when analyzing Jewish population changes, as well as rates of foreign immigration and their influence on hate crime in general, including against Jews.

In their study of violence against foreigners in Germany, and with fixed effects taken into account, Krueger and Pischke (1997) found that economic variables and wages mattered little, but that in eastern Germany, the relative number of foreigners to local population in a county was positively correlated with the number of crimes per resident – a result which was not reached for western Germany. From this, we can understand that an influx of foreigners may indeed influence rates of hate crime, but that this will also necessarily depend on additional factors, which will need to be understood.

In terms of the situation on the ground in Europe today, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has kept track of attacks on migrants and asylum seekers, announcing that there have been assaults against the newcomers (FRA, 2016a). These attacks

have occasionally had state backing and have often been perpetrated by individuals and newly-formed vigilante groups. The report also points out that there has been violence within the refugee community (Ibid.). These facts are important to keep in mind when attempting to analyze potential sources for antisemitic incidents and the attacks that may on the one hand come from the community of newcomers (as we will shortly see), and on the other hand may be linked to reactions by those who are themselves also attacking the newcomers.

Political attitudes may also affect the reporting of hate crimes in a state. Medoff (1999) found that the more "liberal" a state population's ideology, the higher the rate of hate crime. He explained this seemingly paradoxical finding, writing that liberal states tend to be more tolerant, and therefore they have a "lower search cost of identifying potential victims and hence a lower marginal cost of producing a unit of hateful activity" (Medoff, 1999, 967). From this we learn that the political attitudes of the population and consequently, the government, may influence the seriousness with which they address issues of tolerance and hate.

Literature Review on Antisemitism

Within the category of hate crimes and also occupying the space around it (for incidents which are not necessarily considered crimes) sits the issue of antisemitic incidents. Theories describing potential motivations or causes of such incidents and the bias behind them abound, some of which can be traced to general theories surrounding hate crime and others which are separate and highlight the unique and multifaceted nature of antisemitism.

The point has been made that Jews are "radically other" no matter the time or place in question, and therefore antisemitism can both be found and constructed whatever the surrounding circumstances (Chanes, 2008). Still, we would like to examine some potential theoretical causal factors that may encourage antisemitic activity in modern times.

The Economic Factor:

Lazare's (1894) early economic theory for antisemitism establishes envy as a chief motivator of anti-Jewish sentiment. Lazare sees the poor, non-Jewish masses as identifying in the Jew a "commercial capitalist" with no regard for their suffering, and a representative of "foreign wealth" (Chapter 14). In his history of antisemitism in the Western world, Nirenberg (2015) posits that the perception of a Jewish connection with money has been prevalent for hundreds of years, influenced in part by the fact that Jews were often the debt-collectors and moneylenders in a Christian world which rejected such activities as "usury".

In detailing the evolution of modern antisemitism, Laqueur (2006) points to social friction between Jews and non-Jews as a product of economic rivalries, in which Jews were envied for their involvement in economic activities, despite their marginalized status (36-7). This argument was given fuel in the early 20th Century, when Jews were blamed for exploiting the masses and causing economic upheaval. The economic troubles of interwar Germany, Poland and other countries often fed antisemitism and found in the Jews a convenient scapegoat (Ibid., 110). Wistrich (1991) emphasizes that such a jealousy and dislike of Jews on economic grounds also existed, though possibly to a lesser extent, in the Muslim world (197).

Cahnman (1957) writes of the intersection between economic and class struggle with ethnic conflict and establishes that a perception of Jews as having ties to the "economic elite" could fuel antisemitic attitudes (26). Even revolutionary socialist Karl Marx, himself of Jewish background, provided fuel for economic antisemitism when he published an essay that railed against the what he called the "worldly god" of the Jews: money (Marx, 1844).

Although not many serious studies have been done on this topic, a 1996 examination found that despite the stereotypes about Jews and money, there was little support to correlate economics with antisemitism in modern Germany (Legge, 1996). The study found that data provided more support for a xenophobic interpretation of antisemitism in the given context.

Epstein (1993) attempted to find patterns in the wax and wane of antisemitic incidents over a period of 30 years. Although he identified waves of antisemitic violence across countries, he was unable to find anything stronger than a partial correlation between antisemitic waves and ethnic crime, general crime and with economic crises in Western Europe. Epstein concluded that data collection needs to be improved and that the phenomenon must be measured through a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches.

The aforementioned economic bases for antisemitism join the literature linking economics with hate crimes to suggest a potential basis for an economic argument describing antisemitic incidents. Although as of yet there has been no success in finding an empirical connection, the more accurate monitoring and reporting of antisemitic incidents conducted in recent years may provide enough material to work with in determining such a connection.

"New" Antisemitism?

As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the official "Working Definition of Antisemitism" includes extreme and unfair criticism of Israel – the Jewish state – as a manifestation of antisemitism. This was one of the reasons over the controversy surrounding this definition and its erasure from the website of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). Nevertheless, as already stated, it has been given legitimacy through adoption by a large number of states and bodies, and additionally this classification has been supported by research, as presented below.

The inclusion of extreme anti-Israel sentiment and anti-Zionism into definitions and analyses of antisemitism has uncovered a new political basis for antisemitism. As Baum (2012) argues in his analysis of the antisemitic mind, legitimate criticism of the State of Israel's policies has often morphed into a new form of antisemitism, in which the Jewish state has become the "collective Jew", deserving of being excluded, shunned and treated differently.

The geopolitical conflict over land and nationalism in the Middle East has grown to global proportions, and extreme anti-Israel positions have often erupted into antisemitic violence around the world (see, for example, a reported 400% rise in antisemitic incidents during the 2014 Gaza conflict – Eichner, 2015).

Dencik and Marosi (2016) classify this kind of "new antisemitism" as "Israel-derived antisemitism", wherein the perpetrators attack Jews as Jews, and base their attacks upon Israel as a state or Israel's actions. This category includes both a political aspect and a conspiratorial element.

Sharansky (2004) has proposed a "3D" test to distinguish between legitimate criticism of Israel and attitudes that slide into antisemitic sentiment. These criteria are: demonization, double standards and delegitimization of the Jewish state. Matas (2005) has called extreme anti-Zionism a feeder for antisemitism; those who see the Jewish national movement as criminal may, by extension, perceive the world's whole Jewish population to be criminal, given its widespread support for Israel (237).

Some criticize the usage of the term "new antisemitism", instead calling the current phenomenon simply an evolution and re-situation of traditional anti-Jewish thought being "marked by the dialectical interplay between a prior legacy of negative stereotypes and the reality of a new social context" (Chazan, 1997). Looking at it this way, it is not necessary to distinguish between old and new antisemitisms, but rather both must be seen as different forms that are dependent upon prior sources and manifestations of antisemitism. The "new" phenomenon has similarly been called a "recycled" force that aggregates many of the claims historically made against Jews and spreads them globally using modern technology and upgraded, modified discourse (Chessler, 2003, 89).

One of the contentions of theorists describing the "new antisemitism" is that this term often refers to movements on the political left, which traditionally were not viewed as the chief

propagators of antisemitism. One of the early eruptions of extreme anti-Zionism onto the world stage occurred with the 1975 passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, which declared that "Zionism is racism", thus branding the national movement of the Jewish people as illegitimate. Biletsky (1979) documented the Soviet Union's extreme anti-Zionist propaganda push prior to and following the passage of the resolution. Soviet propaganda singled out Jews, called Zionism racist-fascism, denied the existence of the Jews as a people, and attributed classic antisemitic tropes about money, cosmopolitanism and a global conspiracy to the "Zionists" (Ibid.). This activity spurred antisemitic incidents in the USSR, including the appearance of swastikas on the doors of Jewish homes (Ibid., 71-72).

Another milestone for the "new antisemitism" came during the World Conference Against Racism in 2001 and the parallel NGO Forum in Durban, South Africa. In this period of a few days, both state actors and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations from around the world singled out Israel, Zionism and at times Jews as such, as especially evil violators of "left-wing values" (Edelman, 2008). The conference became a turning point in uniting various groups on the political far left in opposition to Israel and the Jewish national movement.

Empirical justification for the link between anti-Zionism or extreme hostility to Israel and antisemitism came in the study conducted by Kaplan and Small (2006), who interviewed 5,000 citizens of 10 different European countries. The researchers asked questions developed through the Anti-Defamation League's (ADL) antisemitism index (used to determine if an individual holds antisemitic views) and questions from the ADL's anti-Israel index (used to determine extreme anti-Israel attitudes), and they found that anti-Israel sentiment consistently predicts the the probability that an individual is antisemitic. Furthermore, the more extreme the anti-Israel sentiment of an individual, the more likely that individual is to be an antisemite (Ibid.). "Based on this analysis," they wrote, "when an individual's criticism becomes

sufficiently severe, it does become reasonable to ask whether such criticism is a mask for underlying anti-Semitism" (Ibid., 560).

Saxe et. al. (2016) quantitatively examined potential influencing factors in antisemitic and anti-Israel sentiment at 50 U.S. university campuses, measured in a survey of Jewish students on those campuses. They found that a key predictor of a perceived hostile climate toward Israel and towards Jews on campus was the presence of an active Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) group on the campus.

Examination of a potential relationship between political changes or factors related to Israel, and antisemitic incidents, may be able to test some of the above points.

The "new antisemitism" has also been expressed in the association of Jews with America, and that of antisemitism with anti-Americanism (Weill, 2008a). Jews have been accused of connections to "American imperialism" and its economic component – globalization. This evolution of the economic basis for antisemitism posits that Jews are responsible for America's hold on global currency and have thus tied themselves with the "right-wing", "Bad America" (Ibid.).

Some have argued that this antisemitism has old, religious Christian roots which have simply resurfaced in "secular guise" in contemporary Europe (Rubenstein, 2008). Rubenstein calls the European anti-globalization movement's fixation on Jews a "return of the repressed", signaling a repackaging of traditional hatred in a way that has been able to unite the far left and the far right together with Muslim extremists in the fight against a supposed Jewish and American conspiracy (Ibid.).

An additional idea used to explain the growth of antisemitism in Europe is "Holocaust fatigue", referring to a growing social apathy on the part of some Western European publics when faced with Jewish suffering (Weill, 2008b). Weill suggests that there is a pervasive sense among some parts of the population in these societies, by which they feel they have heard

enough of Jews talking about Holocaust memory and antisemitic persecution. By adopting anti-Zionist positions and criticizing Jews from a human rights or left-wing perspective, these Europeans are taking part in an effort to "free [their] society of its guilt complex and rid it of the past" with concern to the Jews (Ibid., 17). The idea of absolving one's "guilt" through blaming the Jew in a roundabout way may also lead to a reluctance on the part of certain governments to respond to attacks on the Jewish community when antisemitic incidents rise, which potentially explains a rise in incidents.

These theories of new contexts for antisemitic attitudes can be observed in times of conflict in the Middle East, when the number of antisemitic incidents in many Western countries tends to go up. This was the case in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war; in Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09; and in Operation Protective Edge in 2014 (Moss, 2006; Martin, 2010; Eichner, 2015).

Muslim Antisemitism:

Out of this political perspective on antisemitism comes modern Muslim antisemitism. As introduced in the historical review earlier in this paper, although throughout history there had been examples of theological and societal Islamic animus towards Jews, this rarely came near the levels of the hostility faced by Jews in the Christian world (Wistrich, 1991, Chapter 15).

Still, classical Islam saw Jews as infidels who had not accepted the teachings of Muhammad (Afridi, 2008). This disappointed view of the Jews was based in the Quran and the Hadith, the holy collection of oral stories from the time of the Prophet (Ibid.; Firestone, 2008). The policy adopted by Islamic rulers was to treat the Jews and Christians who lived under its authority as *ahl al-dhimma*, or people of protection who lived under a "beneficent paternalism" (Kelsay, 2008).

Modern antisemitism in the Arab and Muslim world has been described as influenced by geopolitical issues and developed in large part on imported European antisemitism. Modern antisemitism began penetrating into the Middle East in the 19th Century, through Western emissaries who initially introduced such beliefs to Christian minorities (Lewis, 1986). As far back as 1840 and even earlier, there were already blood libels appearing in the the Ottoman Empire, accusing Jews of using gentile blood to bake their food or conduct their rituals (Frankel, 1997). Additional signs of European-imported antisemitism include the popularization in the Arab world of the notorious Russian antisemitic forgery the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, including its use to fuel anti-Jewish riots and killings in Palestine in 1929 (Levy, 2008; Elbogen, 1944, 619).

Contemporary political Islamism incorporated antisemitism through the work of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb, who served as an inspiration for numerous Islamic extremist groups in later years. Qutb published his renowned essay, "Our Struggle with the Jews", in the early 1950's. In it, he outlines what he sees as a global Jewish conspiracy against Islam. By linking Quranic verses with modern ideology and with the State of Israel, Qutb formulated an antisemitic line of thought based on Islamism (Nettler, 1987). In the 1970s, Qutb's essay was reprinted and widely distributed by the Saudi government, giving it larger publicity (Ibid.).

Today, Muslim antisemitism is a byproduct of interaction with the West and is variously considered either an epitome of the "new antisemitism" discussed above – or conversely, an expression of "old antisemitism" with updated discourse (Weitzman, 2008). One sees the continued interaction and inspiration provided by Western antisemites to their peers in the Muslim world in the collaboration between Holocaust deniers from Europe, the US and the Middle East (Ibid.; Kahn, 2008).

Today, many Muslims' identification with the Palestinians often serves to frame their views on Jews (Goldhagen, 2013, 370). Although the reasons behind Muslim antisemitism may not be completely clear (should it be called political, religious or sociological?), there has been evidence that a number of Muslim-majority countries do indeed express more antisemitic attitudes. A Pew Global Attitudes survey in 2011 found that out of seven predominantly Muslim nations surveyed, not one had more than 9% positive opinions of Jews (Pew Research Center, 2011). However, these figures did not measure specifically antisemitism, but rather "favorable" opinions towards Jews, alongside other groups. Another limitation was the relatively limited scope of the survey, which tested only seven such nations.

The Anti-Defamation League's *Global 100* antisemitism index, published in 2014 and updated the following year, found that countries with large Muslim and Arab populations had a higher rate of antisemitic attitudes than others (Anti-Defamation League, 2014). These findings about Muslim- and Arab-majority countries' beliefs regarding Jews are significant in the context of the current large-scale migration from these countries to the West. They may signify the presence of an illiberal strain of thought which may contribute to the rise in antisemitic incidents being reported in the destination countries.

Attitudes of certain groups of Muslims already living in Western countries have also been researched in order to understand what lies at the root of European Muslim beliefs about Jews. Khrosrokhavar (2004) interviewed Muslim prisoners – often second generation French citizens whose families had come from North Africa – in French prisons and found the pervasive feeling of envy, through which these Muslims (mainly Arab) saw the Jews as being economically and culturally integrated despite their independent identity – as opposed to the Muslims/Arabs, who were not well integrated and had difficulties maintaining their identity if they wanted to be accepted in French society. Additionally, using Palestine as a symbol for

Arab and Muslim honor, these prisoners drew a parallel between the disparity among Arabs and Jews in France, and the disparity when dealing with global affairs (Ibid., 14).

On the other hand, Jikeli (2013) interviewed 117 young Muslim males in Germany, France and the United Kingdom, finding that although a relatively high percentage of them displayed antisemitic sentiments, these sentiments had not been influenced by discrimination and exclusion of Muslims, but rather had simply become the norm in some of their social circles.

In terms of perpetrators, although often data on the backgrounds of perpetrators of antisemitic incidents is not provided, available figures for the UK and France show that in recent years, in those countries Muslim perpetrators accounted for more than 30 percent of all culprits in violent antisemitic attacks – a significantly disproportionate number (Jikeli, 2016, 97). Meanwhile, for less violent expressions of antisemitic incidents, Muslims were disproportionately underrepresented in those same countries (Ibid.).

Keeping those attitudes in mind, it must also be mentioned that according to the Moshe Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, *all* of the antisemitic murders that took place in Europe in 2014 and the beginning of 2015 were in one way or another connected to Muslim extremist organizations, either directly or through inspiration (Porat, 2015). The Kantor Center has reported such a trend since its survey of Western European antisemitism in 2009, in which the data showed that most violent antisemitic cases in the region for which identification was available had been perpetrated by those of Arab or Muslim background (Porat and Stauber, 2010).

The Migrant Connection:

The year 2015 saw more than one million immigrants enter Europe, a vast majority of them Muslims from the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan (Porat, 2016). Aside from the

attitudes towards Jews from within the growing Muslim communities of Europe, extreme right-wing movements also targeted Jews with regards to the migrant influx, blaming them for being behind the spike in immigration (Ibid., 12). Jews therefore found themselves in the position of fearing both the potential effects of unfettered Muslim immigration leading to an increase in antisemitism, and on the other hand a fear of the far-right wing reaction to this migrant influx. When analyzing migration's potential effects on an increase or decrease in antisemitic incidents, we must take both of these potential causal factors into account.

Demographic changes through non-selective mass immigration policies have been blamed for an increase in antisemitism in Europe (Gerstenfeld, 2013, 195). In Western Europe, these policies are part of trend that has transformed the region, since the 1950s, from a net exporter of people to a net importer – of guest workers, postcolonial subjects and refugees (Rubenstein, 2008).

Bisin et. al. (2007) found that Muslim immigrants to Western countries integrate overall less and at a slower pace than non-Muslim immigrants, a conclusion which may spark concerns about the permeation of antisemitic attitudes prevalent in migrants' countries of origin. Writing about the intersection between terrorism, hate crimes and assimilation among American Muslims, Gould and Klor (2016) found a path of causality: terror attacks in a country cause an anti-Muslim backlash expressed via hate crimes, which lead to a subsequent slowing of assimilation in Muslim communities and an increase in Muslim traditionalism.

Taking into account Khrosrokhavar's linkage between Muslim communities' non-integration and the phenomenon of antisemitism, the above studies raise the question of whether the extended effect of hate crimes against Muslims may also be a cause of additional antisemitic incidents.

In reference to a suspected significant level of antisemitic acts being perpetrated by Muslims (some of whom are recent immigrants), European authorities' alleged inaction when

dealing with rising levels of antisemitism has been explained by what can be called "humanitarian racism" (Gersenfeld, 2016, 52). This is practiced by those who attribute "reduced responsibility to people of certain ethnic or national groups for their criminal behavior and intentions, even if these are of major dimensions" (Ibid.). Depending on who the perpetrator of an antisemitic incident is, this may alter how and if the authorities respond, and in this way also contribute to a rise or fall in incidents.

Conversely, Berenbaum (2008b) has argued that in fact, historic inaction in the face of antisemitic incidents in a country like France may be linked to the precise perception that Muslims who commit such acts are not seen as "French", and thus the authorities feel more comfortable doing nothing, as it is not the French system which is at fault, but rather the unintegrated Muslim. Seeing as Muslims make up at least 10% of the French population and Jews just under 1%, the government may at times have wanted to avoid a confrontation with such a large sector of society (Ibid.).

However, the connection between Muslim migration and rising antisemitism has also been disputed. In his analysis of Muslim immigration and antisemitism in Germany, Berek (2018) failed to find any conclusive evidence of a rise in antisemitism caused by immigration in recent years, instead pointing a finger at pervasive antisemitism within the whole of German society, bet it among Muslim immigrants or native Germans.

The focus on Muslim antisemitism and a potential connection between rising incidents against Jews and increased migration from Muslim countries is a focus of this study, which tests a quantitative basis for linking the two phenomena.

Recent Quantitative Research:

As can be understood from the historical review, antisemitism writ large is a phenomenon which has existed for thousands of years; however, its examination in a

quantitative fashion has been limited, with an increased interest and research being articulated mainly in recent years. To understand how these studies have been conducted, we must become acquainted with some of them.

The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has conducted an annual aggregation of European reporting on antisemitism for the last four years, each time looking at a 10-year period. This reporting has provided some of the insight needed to advance this study, including official and NGO sources for antisemitism statistics (FRA, 2016b).

In its 2017 report, the FRA concluded that data collection on antisemitic incidents within EU member states continues to be lacking in its reliability, and that different methods for recording and defining such incidents interfere with attempts at comparing trends in various countries (FRA, 2017). The report also included references to survey-based studies conducted in various EU member states, which measured perceptions of antisemitism and the experiences of Jewish citizens. It is important to take these conclusions into account in order to understand that studies such as the current one provide one aspect of a greater effort at understanding the phenomenon of modern antisemitism.

The Moshe Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry releases an annual report which attempts to paint an overall picture of the situation in Europe (Porat, 2015 & 2016). The compilation of this report attempts to standardize reporting by listing and analyzing only incidents determined to have been "violent". The Kantor Center's reports were consulted for this study to provide an additional perspective into the categorization and quantification of antisemitic incidents.

A different type of quantitative analysis of antisemitism around the world can be found in the ADL's *Global 100,* which has succeeded in analyzing global antisemitic *attitudes*. The survey was conducted only in 2014, with a partial update in 2015. This means that there is not yet an opportunity for an empirical study on the results of the poll. However, as antisemitism

cannot only be measured by incidents, a concurrent measure of attitudes may be helpful when trying to get a more comprehensive view of the trends (ADL, 2014). The ADL report provides estimates of how many people in over 100 countries hold antisemitic views, and it analyzes the breakdown of this information by region, age, religion and a number of other identifying criteria.

Methodology/Research Method

In addition to the historical and theoretical reviews provided above, as well as comparisons that touch upon to the results of previous quantitative research, this study's purpose is to test a theory-based explanation for antisemitism in an effort to confidently identify a causal factor behind fluctuations in recorded antisemitic incidents for a number of developed countries.

As mentioned above, previous attempts of quantitative analyses on the topic of antisemitic incidents have largely turned up incomplete results. Although in their analysis of five European countries in the years prior to World War 2, Brustein and King (2004) managed to find some correlations between rising antisemitic activity and lower GDP, in addition to rising Jewish immigration, their research was constrained by a limited data set and a number of uncontrolled factors. Epstein (1993) recommended better monitoring and data gathering techniques, pointing out that quantification of the phenomenon is country- and time-specific. Green, McFalls and Smith (2001) highlighted the difficulty in gathering accurate statistics on any type of hate crimes, as the classification always depends on definition and reporting. Meanwhile, Dawidowicz (1971) asked if antisemitism can be measured in the first place, due to country-specific concerns and transfer between cultures.

These challenges are worth attempting to tackle now due to improved monitoring, collection and reporting apparatuses set up throughout a number of countries, sometimes by

governments and other times by Jewish nongovernmental and community organizations. Additionally, the accurate reporting of our explanatory variable – migrants from Muslim countries – makes it easier for us to focus on a meaningful variable of interest.

Research Design:

The quantitative component of this study uses the Stata statistics program to conduct a panel regression analysis which takes into account 10 countries over a period of 15 years and attempts to describe the relationship between fluctuations in the migration from Muslim countries and fluctuations in antisemitic incidents, while controlling for other potential influencing factors.

The panel regression was conducted with fixed effects for country and year in order to account for additional internal, independent factors within each country that could be influencing antisemitic incidents and for external shocks such as events related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which could influence all of the countries at once. The goal is to examine the situation within each country separately, and to gain a better overall understanding of the link between the tested variables.

Below, we discuss each one of the variables and covariates individually, explaining its source and the purpose of its use in the regression analysis. We also provide brief summaries of the statistics and hypotheses for the expected relationships between the variables.

Dependent Variable: Antisemitic Incidents

The primary dependent variable in this study is the number of antisemitic incidents as defined and gathered by each monitoring organization or government, over the time period of 2001 until 2015, in 10 different countries. Countries were selected based on available data, and this inevitably led to a data set consisting of OECD states with developed information-

gathering systems. Data was gathered from both governmental agencies and NGOs, and in the case of a country with both an official and an unofficial source of figures, the data set uses the most complete source. These figures come both from government agencies and nongovernmental watchdogs; however, the figures for each country are consistent in their source and methodology each year. Thus, the following sources were used:

Official (Government):

Austria (Federal Ministry of the Interior), France (CNCDH – National Consultative Commission on Human Rights – together with the Jewish NGO CRIF), Germany (Federal Ministry of the Interior), Sweden (BRA – National Council for Crime Prevention), United States (FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation)

Unofficial (Jewish NGO):

Australia (ECAJ – Executive Council of Australian Jewry), Belgium (Antisemitisme.be), Canada (B'nai Brith), Netherlands (CIDI – Center for Documentation and Information on Israel), United Kingdom (CST – Community Security Trust)

It is important to note here that at the beginning of data collection, the initial sample consisted of 20 countries, but due to difficulty in filling all of the applicable years and in finding corresponding independent variables for each country, half of the original group was dropped in favor of a more complete and balanced sample. Changes in methodology were also taken into account in choosing the sample; thus, countries whose data collection techniques experienced an overhaul that significantly altered the statistics were excluded from the final sample.

Additionally, in the case of Argentina, the full antisemitism figures were gathered from the DAIA Jewish NGO for all of the years covered; however, due to the absence of migration statistics for Argentina, the country was removed from the final sample because of its irrelevance in the main specification for this study. While figures for Argentina are shown in the tables and graphs analyzing antisemitism statistics in this section, they are not included in the overall sample analysis.

Table 1.1: Summary Statistics – Antisemitic Incidents by Country

	Antisemitic Incidents					Ln(Antisemitic Incidents)			
Variable	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
Argentina*	15	296.2667	138.5561	126	586	5.5917	0.4623	4.8363	6.3733
Australia	15	564.8	165.8494	328	962	6.297	0.2909	5.793	6.869
Austria	15	21.4	14.79286	3	58	2.824	0.7616	1.0986	4.0604
Belgium	15	65.53333	22.92493	28	109	4.1197	0.3818	3.3322	4.6913
Canada	15	1034.467	372.9341	286	1627	6.8559	0.4736	5.656	7.3945
France	15	599.4	230.1766	219	974	6.3206	0.4152	5.389	6.8814
Germany	15	1466.933	173.7591	1226	1690	7.284	0.1199	7.1115	7.4325
Netherlands	15	181.0667	92.51908	96	359	5.0915	0.4645	4.5643	5.8833
Sweden	15	169.6667	61.22519	102	277	5.074	0.3569	4.625	5.624
United Kingdom	15	616.0667	240.1926	310	1182	6.358	0.3704	5.7366	7.075
United States	15	854.2	147.1545	609	1043	6.735	0.184	6.4118	6.9499
United States+	15	1303.533	327.7056	751	1821	7.1409	0.2673	6.6214	7.5071
Total Sample	**150**	**557.3533**	**480.01**	**3**	**1690**	**5.6960**	**1.3918**	**1.0986**	**7.4325**

*Argentina was not included in the final sample of this study.
+Alternative US figures were collected for the full time period from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). These were used in the alternative data set, tested in Table 2.2.

Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the dependent variable by country, both in the variable's original form and in the logged version, which is used in the study due to its more normal and less-skewed expression of the data. It briefly describes the extent of antisemitic incidents in each country over the 15-year period examined. The data consists of 15 observations per country, one for each year. The number of recorded antisemitic incidents in any given year ranges from 3 in Austria to 1,690 in Germany, with those same countries having a minimum log of 1.099 and a maximum log of 7.433, respectively. One should be

cautious in reaching conclusions about any particular country based on the number of incidents recorded there, or when comparing between the countries. This is because each country has its own system for collecting such data, as well as its own definitions and classifications of such incidents. The statistics are presented to show the extent of the data with which the study deals.

Figure 1: Graphics of Panel Data – Antisemitic Incidents, by Country and Year



*Argentina was not included in the final sample of this study.

Figure 1 shows a graphical description of the dependent variable in panel form, both in its original expression and in the logged version used in this study. This shows the fluctuations in antisemitic incidents by country, between the years 2001 and 2015. From examining this representation, we can notice hints at some varying trends within the data. First, while some countries seem to portray a rise in incidents or logged rates over the examined time period, others show a relatively stable number of incidents or logged rates. Additionally, a few overall spikes can be noticed across many of the countries sampled, and these seem to correspond occasionally to flare-ups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (for example, the spikes in 2009 and 2014 correspond to concurrent conflicts between Israel and Hamas in Gaza – the Israel Defense Forces' Operation Cast Lead in late 2008-early 2009 and Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014).

Table 1.2: Summary Statistics – Antisemitism by 1 Million Population

		Incidents by 1M Population				Ln(Incidents by 1M Population)			
Variable	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
Argentina*	15	7.3045	3.3737	3.0247	14.813	1.8936	0.4494	1.1068	2.6955
Australia	15	26.239	7.1532	16.083	44.349	3.2341	0.2656	2.7778	3.7921
Austria	15	2.5479	1.7159	0.3730	6.7865	0.7062	0.7457	-0.9861	1.9149
Belgium	15	6.0613	2.0287	2.6985	10.096	1.7449	0.3625	0.9927	2.3121
Canada	15	30.625	10.112	9.2015	45.785	3.3495	0.4344	2.2194	3.8240
France	15	9.3379	3.6240	3.5693	15.533	2.1590	0.4118	1.2724	2.7430
Germany	15	17.929	2.0528	14.854	20.634	2.8802	0.1160	2.6983	3.0270
Netherlands	15	11.035	5.7740	5.7296	22.231	2.2887	0.4751	1.7457	3.1015
Sweden	15	18.154	6.0365	11.429	28.268	2.8482	0.3286	2.4361	3.3417
United Kingdom	15	9.8736	3.5918	5.2436	18.293	2.2331	0.3447	1.6570	2.9065
United States	15	2.8325	0.5690	1.9114	3.6600	1.0204	0.2163	0.6478	1.2975
United States+	15	4.3345	1.2191	2.3748	6.2192	1.4263	0.3012	0.8649	1.8276
Total Sample	**150**	**13.463**	**10.359**	**0.3730**	**45.785**	**2.2464**	**0.9312**	**-0.9861**	**3.8240**

*Argentina was not included in the final sample of this study.
+Alternative US figures were collected for the full time period from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). These were used in the alternative data set, tested in Table 2.2.

An alternative measure of antisemitism was created by determining how many antisemitic incidents were carried out annually in each country, for every million people in the

population.[4] This measure provides a look at the proportion of incidents by population and allows for an additional understanding of the phenomenon. Table 1.2 examines this alternative variable in its original form and in the log transformation, finding an overall sample mean of 13.46 incidents per million people, and an overall mean log value of 2.246.

Based on the summary of the data by population, we see that Canada leads with the highest mean number of antisemitic incidents per million people (with 30.6), followed by Australia (with 26.2) and Sweden (18.2 incidents). Although these are interesting figures, we should be careful when making such comparisons between countries, due to different collection methods in each country and the absence of a universally accepted system for classifying antisemitic incidents.

Dependent Variable Dilemmas:

The initial methodological dilemma that came up with the dependent variable was a difficulty in gathering the recorded figures from such a large number of potential sources. The data gathering and monitoring in each country is different, and a uniform recording and monitoring system has not been created to overcome this challenge. As stated above, the way we dealt with this issue was by gathering data from a number of organizations which are consistent in their gathering techniques over the maximum desired number of years. In this way, we understand that the same organization or government has gathered figures on antisemitic incidents in a similar way over a period of years, unless otherwise stated. In instances where there was a significant change and/or an admitted lack in data collection, the country was dropped from the sample.

Another dilemma which comes into any study on reported hate crimes or bias incidents is the question of the reporting itself. The issue may be present either via underreporting or in

[4] Population data was collected from the World Bank's database, which aggregates annual population figures from a number of international and government bodies (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL).

over-reporting. In underreporting, people affected as targets of antisemitic behavior or other hate incidents may hesitate to report the incident to the proper authorities. This can happen either due to a lack of education about the proper procedures, a reluctance to get the authorities involved for one reason or another or a desire to let the issue slide, a fear of retaliation, or other reasons. The US Department of Justice found that for the years 2011-2015, approximately 54% of all hate crime victimizations were not reported to police (Masucci and Langton, 2017). Gerstenfeld (2016) writes that Jews in Europe often prefer to keep a "low profile" and do not complain or report incidents "because they expect the authorities to do little or nothing," and that Jewish leaders sometimes even "whitewash" antisemitic events (339).

At the same time, over-reporting can occur, in that some people may see an interest in reporting an event as having a hate-oriented motive when in actuality it had a different context (Iganski and Lagou, 2015). This may also skew the reporting and produce an image of unnaturally high numbers of antisemitic incidents. On the question of over-reporting and underreporting, again we defer to the organizations themselves. As all of the organizations and governments in this study have had years of experience in this field, they are trusted to provide as consistent an account as possible under the circumstances.

An additional way in which we address the issue of varying levels of reporting for each country is through the country fixed effect that is placed on all panel regressions in this study. If, for example, reporting levels in Country X and Y differ because of varying levels of trust in law enforcement and in government action against antisemitism, then the country fixed effect is able to account for these differences, which characterize each individual country.

Independent Predictor Variable: Migration from Muslim Countries

Based on the reviewed theories of hate crime and antisemitism, and taking into account the recent relevant literature and current challenges with migration and integration facing a

number of the OECD countries being examined, the independent predictor variable of the study was chosen to be migration from Muslim countries. The additional variable categories of economic factors, national political factors and a country's relationship with Israel were used to control for the influence of other theories and phenomena potentially affecting the dependent variable.

The annual number of migrants coming in from Muslim countries was gathered from the OECD's International Migration Database, and the data includes the annual migrant inflow into each country of individuals originating in Muslim-majority or Muslim-oriented countries (isolated to the 57 members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation).[5] Due to the absence of Argentina in the pool of OECD countries providing annual statistics to the database, and after a failure to obtain accurate information on migration from Argentinian government sources, the country was dropped from the sample, setting the final number of countries in the study at 10.

Table 1.3: Summary Statistics – OIC Migrants by Country (in thousands)

	OIC Migrants					Ln(OIC Migrants)			
Variable	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
Australia	15	27.3673	5.845408	16.1	36.32	3.2859	0.2304	2.779	3.592
Austria	15	19.2873	14.65151	11.53	70.71	2.827	0.4496	2.445	4.259
Belgium	15	19.87	9.647201	11.78	50.31	2.9106	0.3826	2.466	3.9182
Canada	15	63.348	5.584737	53.52	73.1	4.145	0.0884	3.980	4.2918
France	15	93.3267	9.58789	66.82	105.97	4.5306	0.1120	4.202	4.6632
Germany	15	146.756	158.917	67.01	708.38	4.755	0.5774	4.205	6.563
Netherlands	15	15.1087	5.36439	9.48	30.09	2.6666	0.3099	2.249	3.4042
Sweden	15	25.3913	11.2921	11.34	47.52	3.1344	0.4753	2.428	3.8612
United Kingdom	15	49.0633	16.3360	16	82	3.8271	0.4067	2.773	4.4067
United States	15	148.826	30.0381	83.9	187.88	4.9808	0.2257	4.430	5.2358
Total Sample	**150**	**60.8345**	**70.5485**	**9.48**	**708.38**	**3.7063**	**0.8866**	**2.249**	**6.563**

Table 1.3 shows the summary statistics for the independent variable by country, both in their original form and in the log-transformed form used in the study. As we see, the final

[5] Migration data gathered from OECD.Stat International Migration Database on 6 July 2017. http://stats.oecd.org.

sample is made up of 10 countries with 150 total observations. Every country in the final sample accepted migrants from Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries over the 15 specified years, with numbers of incoming migrants ranging from a minimum of 9,480 in the Netherlands to a maximum of 708,380 in Germany. This is important to recognize in order to understand the extent of the migration occurring from OIC countries into OECD states measured in the sample, as well as the differences in migration rates to the countries examined.

Meanwhile, an alternative way to understand the numbers is to examine the proportion of incoming OIC migrants out of the total number of migrants entering a country each year. A summary of this data in percentage points can be seen in Table 1.4. Thus, we see that the mean annual percentage of OIC-origin migrants for the sample between the years of 2001-2015 stands at 21.61%, with annual percentages ranging from 5.54% in the UK to 68.26% in France. We also see that overall, France had the highest mean percentage of OIC migrants coming in during the specified time period, with 49.89% of all migrants from 2001-2015 originating in OIC countries, while the UK again had the lowest mean, at 11.75%. These large discrepancies portray the difference in the scope of OIC migration among the different countries in the sample.

Table 1.4: Summary Statistics – % OIC Migrants out of Total Migrants

Variable	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
Australia	15	14.761	1.999	12.21	18.58
Austria	15	16.725	5.986	12.15	35.59
Belgium	15	19.435	4.390	14.72	33.73
Canada	15	25.224	1.328	23.13	27.41
France	15	49.891	11.887	38.59	68.26
Germany	15	15.973	6.0998	11.12	35.13
Netherlands	15	15.578	4.933	9.87	25.63
Sweden	15	32.561	5.428	23.63	41.73
United Kingdom	15	11.745	3.210	5.54	18.1
United States	15	14.205	2.163	10.94	17.36
Total Sample	**150**	**21.610**	**12.355**	**5.54**	**68.26**

To better illustrate the primary OIC migrants variable, the following two graphical representations should be examined. In Figure 2, we see a panel graphic showing the annual fluctuations in OIC migration for all 10 relevant countries. We immediately notice the big leap that Germany made in its OIC migration intake from 2014 to 2015, during which OIC migrants jumped from 195,928 people in 2014 to 708,377 in 2015 – an increase of 260%. This is important to note, as it may play a part in affecting our results.

Figure 2: Graphic of Panel Data – OIC Migrants, 2001-2015



In order to normalize the data and address the effect of Germany's jump in 2015, in Figure 3 we see a graphical representation of the log transformed values for this variable. We see many fluctuations and what looks like an overall slight, gradual rise in logged values of OIC migrants for most of the countries over the relevant years, although there are also those whose logged migrant intake stayed quite stable.

Figure 3: Graphic of Panel Data – Logged OIC Migrants, 2001-2015



This variable is expected to have some effect on the number of annual antisemitic incidents, although the hypothesized direction is not immediately clear. Potentially, a higher influx of migrants from largely-Muslim countries may contribute to *more* antisemitism due to generally high antisemitic attitudes in their countries of origin and their demographic.[6] Other reasons may also be behind a potential related rise in antisemitism: the arrival of new immigrants may lead to a reawakening xenophobia in European and other Western countries, causing a consequent increase in antisemitism as well. Additionally, a nativist/xenophobic backlash in the country accepting the migrants could blame Jewish advocates for immigration or multiculturalism for the large influx of migrants, causing an antisemitic reaction which results in more incidents. On the other hand, a higher Muslim influx into the target countries may also result in a rise in antisemitic incidents in which some Muslim migrants themselves are the ones carrying out the the violations.

[6] See *ADL Global 100* breakdown of antisemitic attitudes by religion and region: http://global100.adl.org/info/anti_semitism_info ; see also Pew Global Attitudes survey from 2011 *Muslim-Western Tensions Persist* at http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-western-tensions-persist/ .

Alternatively, one may postulate that there would be a *decrease* in antisemitic incidents with the arrival of migrants from Muslim countries, resulting from a redirection of hate activity from Jewish targets to Muslim and immigrant ones.

An important note must be made here: while the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is made up mainly of Muslim-majority states, it also includes a number of countries which have chosen to align themselves with the organization, yet do not have a Muslim demographic majority. These countries contain either a Muslim plurality or a significant Muslim minority population within their borders.[7] This detail, along with the fact that not every immigrant from a Muslim country is indeed Muslim themselves, pushes us to use caution when analyzing the results of this study. Nevertheless, OIC countries were chosen and used as a close proxy for Muslim countries, as overall they are a relatively accurate predictor for immigrants coming from Muslim origins.

Hypothesis: Being informed by the literature on the effect of demographic changes on hate crimes, as well as additional literature on the changing nature of antisemitism, an increase in Muslim immigrants to a country will lead to a rise in the number of antisemitic incidents in that country.

An initial line-fitted scatter plot of the OIC migrants variable and antisemitic incidents for the sample (Figure 4) shows a positive correlation between the two variables. When transformed into natural logarithms to take into account for a potentially nonlinear relationship in the regression analysis, the data also portrays a positive correlation, now better organized. We notice the outlier point in both plots, representing the data for Germany's dramatic jump

[7] OIC members whose populations do not contain a clear majority of Muslims include: Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Guineau-Bissau, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Nigeria, Suriname, Togo and Uganda. These countries have either pluralities or significant minorities of Muslim citizens. Information on relevant countries was gathered from the OIC website (https://www.oic-oci.org); demographic information was gathered from the *CIA World Factbook* (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).

in migrants in 2015. Without this point in both plots, the slope of the fitted line would be even stronger. This is an interesting observation which lends some initial support to the hypothesis. It will accompany us into the development of the regression analysis.

Figure 4: Scatter Plots with Fitted Lines for OIC Migrants and Antisemitic Incidents



Control Variables

Economic Variables:

The first control variables examined were GDP per capita at purchasing power parity and unemployment rate. The GDP measure was expressed in current thousands of international dollars based on the 2011 ICP (International Comparison Program) round, and unemployment was expressed in percentage points. Figures were collected from World Bank data for each of the 10 countries examined in the final sample.[8] [9]

These variables were chosen to represent the overall general economic wellbeing of each country's society, as well as the condition of individuals within the society. The measurement of GDP per capita gives a picture of the economic situation on a macro scale and

[8] GDP per capita, PPP gathered from World Bank, International Comparison Program Database, on 2 January 2017. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD

[9] Unemployment data gathered from World Bank, International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database in March 2017. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?page=5

allows for a per capita comparison, while unemployment rate provides a metric of a negative economic condition affecting a certain percentage of the population. Additional variables were originally taken into consideration for potential use, most notably the Gini coefficient for measuring inequality; however, due to a lack of statistics across the list of countries and years, these variables were dropped in favor of maintaining a larger sample.

Based on the literature on hate crimes and antisemitism, the expected correlation between the two economic variables and the dependent variable is as follows: a negative link between per capita GDP and antisemitic incidents, and a positive correlation between percent unemployment and the prevalence of such incidents. This is based on the idea that when the economy is in worse condition on both the national and the local scale, there may be more antisemitism due to a scapegoating of Jews and the stereotypical and conspiratorial association of the Jewish community with money and finance.

Figure 5: Scatter Plots with Fitted Lines for GDP Per Capita PPP and Antisemitic Incidents



Contrary to our expectations, a basic line-fitted scatter plot (Figure 5) of GDP per capita PPP and antisemitic incidents shows evidence of a very slight *positive* correlation between the two variables. This seems to be due to the general trend throughout the countries being sampled of a rise in GDP per capita during the years of interest, and concurrently a slight rise in

antisemitic incidents. When both antisemitic incidents and GDP per capita are transformed into natural logarithms to take into account for a potentially nonlinear relationship in the regression analysis, the data also portrays a slight positive correlation, now better organized.

Meanwhile, a scatter plot of unemployment rate and antisemitic incidents (Figure 6) shows evidence of a positive correlation between the two variables, as expected. A log transformation for the dependent variable plotted against the unemployment also turns out a positive correlation in a slightly more organized fashion.

Figure 6: Scatter Plots with Fitted Lines for Unemployment and Antisemitic Incidents



National Political Factors:

As understood through the historic and theoretical review, right- and left-wing politics have played an important part in the development of antisemitic sentiment and activity over the last century. The inclusion of political factors as control variables when examining antisemitic incidents is therefore important in order to better understand the connection between the desired variables.

Political variables taken into account in this study are the orientation of the leading government party of the state (right- or left-wing) and whether the country held executive or legislative elections in a given year. The government's political orientation is important to take into account for examining the impact of different ideological streams – especially those

elected by the people – on the appearance of antisemitic incidents. Election years are also an important variable due to the heightened appearance of rhetoric and propaganda, as well as popular political involvement during such years, in which political emotions run high and some extremism (including antisemitism) may also be expressed.

Variable data was gathered from the World Bank's "Database of Political Institutions (DPI2015)", using the database's classification system for right- and left-wing political parties in the sample countries as well as the information on both legislative and executive elections.[10]

The data on political orientation is presented in the regression as a binary categorical variable, with 1 signifying a right-wing party leading the government and 0 meaning a centrist or left-wing party (centrist parties led governments on only two occasions within the sample). Data on election year is also presented as a dichotomous variable, with 1 meaning that an executive or legislative election was held that year, and 0 meaning that it was not.

Looking at the literature and current events, it is difficult to pinpoint whether in today's political climate one would expect a closer relationship between right-wing or left-wing politics and antisemitic incidents. In a basic paired t-test to compare the means of antisemitic incidents under governments led by right-wing parties versus centrist and left-wing ones (graphic portrayal in Figure 7), we found that the mean of incidents under right-wing-led governments stands at 588.5698 ± 515.1812, while mean incidents under left-wing and centrist-led governments stand at 515.4063 ± 428.6306 incidents – a 72-point higher figure for right-wing governing parties. However, a lack of statistical significance and a very high standard deviation make this only an initial hint at a potential correlation.

[10] Data gathered from Cruz, C., Keefer, P. and Scartascini, C. (2016), "Database of Political Institutions Codebook, 2015 Update (DPI2015)." Inter-American Development Bank. Updated version of Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer and Patrick Walsh, 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions." 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic Review, https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7408 .

When conducting a similar paired t-test to compare means for antisemitism in countries that are or are not experiencing election years, we found an even less clear relationship (Figure 8). The mean antisemitic incidents in an election year stand at 582.7391 ± 486.520 incidents, while a non-election year has a mean of 546.125 ± 479.043 incidents. These results are only approximately 36.6 points from each other (with election years having a slightly higher mean of antisemitic incidents), but the test is once again not statistically significant and has a very large standard error.

Figure 7: Mean Antisemitism by Gov't Party



Figure 8: Mean Antisemitism by Election Year



Relations with Israel/Travelers to Israel:

After examining theories on modern-day antisemitism and adopting the "International Definition of Antisemitism" as presented earlier in this paper, it becomes clear that in order to understand this phenomenon in its current context, one cannot ignore the connection to the State of Israel. The control variable of tourism to Israel was chosen to serve as a proxy for relations between a given country and Israel, at the level of people-to-people connections and a public familiarity with the Jewish state.

This proxy variable is the number of tourists who came from a given country into Israel each year. These figures provide insight into trends of a connection to Israel among the

populations of each country, including fluctuations which may signify an increase or decrease in the connection between foreign citizens and Israel. Figures on incoming travelers were gathered from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics.[11]

Based on the literature and common sense, one would expect the relationship between this variable and antisemitism would be negative; i.e., more tourists from a country visiting Israel (signifying a closer relationship between the people of that country and Israel) would correspond with fewer antisemitic incidents in that country.

When examined in a basic line-fitted scatterplot (Figure 9), the evidence points to a positive correlation between travelers to Israel and antisemitic incidents. When both variables are transformed into natural logarithms to normalize the data and take into account a potentially nonlinear relationship in the regression analysis, the data also portrays a positive correlation, now better organized.

Figure 9: Scatter Plots with Fitted Lines for Travelers to Israel and Antisemitic Incidents



These observations raise questions as to why such a relationship may exist, given the initial speculations mentioned above. Because this is just an initial scatterplot examination, the relationship of this control variable within the regression analysis will also be noted.

[11] Data published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in its annual *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, in the category of "Tourist Arrivals, by Country of Residence/Citizenship", accessed on 26 March 2018. http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/ .

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1.5 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control variables discussed above and used in the subsequent main regression specification of this study. The table summarizes the statistics in terms of the complete data sample, rather than by country as done above. The basic sample used for all variables except for migrants from OIC countries and non-antisemitic hate crimes takes into account the 10 OECD countries examined (due to its incomplete results, Argentina is excluded from this summary). The primary regression consists of 10 countries over a period of 15 years, or 150 observations. For the study, the continuous variables of antisemitic incidents, OIC migrants, GDP per capita and travelers to Israel were all transformed into natural logarithms for a more normalized sample, and their logged values are presented in Column 2.

Table 1.5: Summary Statistics - Chief Dependent, Independent and Control Variables

		(1) Variables				(2) Log-Transformed Variables			
Variable	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
Antisemitic Incidents	150	557.353	480.01	3	1690	5.6960	1.3918	1.0986	7.4325
Migrants from OIC countries (in 1000's)	150	60.834	70.5485	9.48	708.38	3.7063	0.8866	2.249	6.563
GDP Per Capita PPP (thousands of dollars)	150	38.844	6.316	27.4	56.12	3.6463	0.1642	3.3105	4.0275
Unemployment (%)	150	6.6216	1.8353	2.12	11.17				
Travelers to Israel (in thousands)	150	119.479	151.423	6.7	620.3	4.0978	1.1767	1.9021	6.4302
Right-Wing Government	150	.57333	.49625	0	1				
Election Year (executive and/or legislative)	150	.30667	.46265	0	1				

The mean of logged antisemitic incidents over the sample stands at 5.696, while the mean of logged OIC migrants is 3.706. As presented in more detail in the individual analyses of the variables above, it is important to understand that a large range also exists in the statistics

of different countries for the independent and dependent variables. This may be due to country size, data collection techniques, immigration and hate crimes policies, etc. For this reason, we must emphasize the function of the fixed effects in the subsequent panel regression.

For the control variables, the mean GDP per capita at purchasing power parity over the 10-country total sample for all 15 years stands at $38,844, which is approximately equal to the overall 2013 OECD average.[12] As GDP per capita was overall consistently rising among OECD countries between 2001-2015, the relatively high mean points to an overall economically-stronger set of countries included in the sample. At the same time, the mean of logged GDP per capita for the sample stands at 3.6463. Mean unemployment rate for the sample is 6.62%, which statistically is higher than the global mean for those same years (5.76%).[13] The unemployment rate, which ranges from 2.12% to 11.7%, shows significant fluctuation between countries and within them.

The variable measuring travelers to Israel, which has a mean of 119,479 travelers within the sample, also has a very significant standard deviation (151,423 travelers) and range. The mean of logged travelers to Israel in that same period is 4.0978. Similarly to the independent and dependent variables in this study, the number of travelers to Israel varies greatly by country and by year and can be influenced by certain external factors related to conflict and safety concerns.

The political variables of a right-wing government and whether or not the country is in an election year are dichotomous control variables. From the summary we understand that a majority (57.3%) of observations from the sample had a right wing government, while a minority (30.7%) were in an election year.

[12] Mean OECD GDP per capita PPP in 2013 stood at $38,936. Figure comes from *OECD Data*, found at https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-product-gdp.htm (accessed on 21 May 2018).

[13] Global mean unemployment for the years 2001-2015 was calculated through data from the International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database as published on the World Bank's data site https://data.worldbank.org (accessed on 21 May 2018).

Results

Panel Regression

A panel regression was constructed for the sample to examine the relationship between migrants from OIC countries and antisemitic incidents, while controlling for the additional covariates that may influence the prevalence of antisemitic incidents. The goal was to examine a connection between the variables which exceeds simple correlation, with the understanding that in a given year there may also be concurrent partial correlations between some of the existing variables (for example, economic conditions of a country and the number of migrants wanting to arrive, or economy and travelers to Israel, etc.).

A fixed effect was placed on both country and year, allowing us to focus on the internal fluctuations in antisemitism within each country of the sample without subjecting them to external shocks that would raise incidents in all countries, as well as controlling for any "inherent" antisemitism that may exist within a country without regard to changing variables, and to address the varying levels of trust across countries in law enforcement and the subsequent effects of under- or over-reporting.

A logarithmic transformation was conducted for all continuous variables (dependent, independent and covariates) except for unemployment in order to regularize the data and also to account for potential nonlinear relationships between the variables.[14] Based on the scatterplots presented in the discussion of variables above, we understand that when transformed into natural logarithms, the data are indeed more organized.

Additionally, a one-year lead was placed on antisemitic incidents, in order to establish a clearer direction of influence for the relationships between independent/control and

[14] A natural log transformation was not placed upon unemployment rate, which is itself measured by percentage points. Additionally, it was not placed upon the political variables (right-wing government and election year), which are binary categorical variables.

dependent variables. We thus assume that the independent variable and covariates should all be reflected in the following year's level of antisemitic incidents.[15]

The panel OLS model was estimated as follows:

$$\text{Antisemitic Incidents}_{i(t+1)} = \alpha + \beta\text{OIC Migrants}_{it} + \gamma\text{GDP\_pc}_{it} + \delta\text{Unemployment}_{it} + \zeta\text{Israel}_{it} + \eta\text{Political}_{it} + \theta\text{Election}_{it} + \iota_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i(t+1)}$$

Where $\text{Antisemitic Incidents}_{i(t+1)}$ is the natural logarithm of the number of antisemitic incidents in a given country in the year following the year being examined for the other variables. α is the intercept. OIC Migrants is the logged number of migrants (in thousands) to said country from Organization of Islamic Cooperation member states in the given year.[16] GDP_pc is the control variable for logged GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (in thousands of dollars), by country and year. Unemployment is the rate of recorded unemployment in a country in a particular year, in percentage points. "Israel" refers to the relationship between a country and Israel, as measured by the logged number of travelers to Israel (in thousands) from a particular country in a particular year. Political refers to the political orientation (right-wing or not) of the governing party of a country during that year. Election refers to whether the particular country is in an election year. ι_i is a country fixed effect unique to country *i*, employed to control for country-specific characteristics which may affect the prevalence of antisemitic incidents. τ_t is the time fixed effect, capturing time-specific changes that could affect antisemitic incidents in all countries simultaneously. $\varepsilon_{i(t+1)}$ is the error term for country *i* in year *t+1*.

[15] As data on antisemitic incidents and most of our covariates is collected and reported on an annual basis, we are not able to break it down by month or season and be certain of chronological validity. By placing a lead on the dependent variable, we are able to more confidently analyze the events chronologically and ensure that we are evaluating antisemitic incidents that occurred after the independent variable and covariates.

[16] It should be noted that due to the use of a logarithmic model for both the independent and dependent variable in this analysis, a 1% change in OIC migrants will bring about a β% change in antisemitic incidents.

Table 2.1: Panel OLS- The Effect of OIC Migrants on Antisemitic Incidents

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable: Ln(Antisemitic Incidents) (t + 1)						
OIC Migrants in thousands	0.411***	0.286**	0.285**	0.294**	0.293**	0.297**
	(0.110)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.128)
GDP Per Capita PPP in thousands of $		-0.0719	-0.325	-1.162	-1.280	-1.346
		(0.905)	(1.105)	(1.160)	(1.185)	(1.190)
Unemployment (%)			-0.0128	-0.000744	-0.00479	-0.00604
			(0.0318)	(0.0318)	(0.0328)	(0.0329)
Travelers to Israel in thousands				0.503**	0.478*	0.488**
				(0.240)	(0.245)	(0.246)
Right-Wing Government					-0.0339	-0.0380
					(0.0646)	(0.0650)
Election Year (Executive and/or Legislative)						-0.0527
						(0.0666)
Constant	4.231***	4.949+	5.890+	6.781*	7.317*	7.507*
	(0.402)	(3.180)	(3.957)	(3.922)	(4.066)	(4.080)
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	140	140	140	140	140	140
adj. R squared	0.0285	0.0960	0.0894	0.116	0.110	0.107

Standard errors in parentheses
Significance levels: + p<0.2, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All continuous variables except for unemployment are natural log-transformed (OIC migrants, GDP per capita, Travelers to Israel)

Table 2.1 shows the estimation of the effect of OIC migrants on antisemitic incidents in the countries sampled. Based on the final specification appearing in column 6, we see a significant positive relationship (a coefficient of 0.297 at the 5% level) between the logged variables of OIC migrants and antisemitic incidents over the subsequent year. The direction of the relationship is consistent with the prevailing literature on modern antisemitism, with our initial correlation examination in Figure 4 and also with the hypothesis.

This coefficient is interpreted as follows: according to the model, for each annual 1% rise in the number of OIC migrants coming into a country, there is a predicted 0.297% rise in antisemitic incidents in that country the following year. For a 10% rise in OIC migrants, there is a predicted 2.97% rise in incidents the following year.

Thus, for example, the 23.1% rise in OIC migrants which occurred in the Netherlands during the year 2008, taken without any additional (listed or unlisted) covariates, would account for a 6.86% rise in antisemitic incidents in the following year – predicting an estimated total of 115.4 incidents in 2009 (a rise from 108 incidents in 2008). The OIC migrants variable here explains part of the ultimate jump in antisemitic incidents which occurred in the Netherlands in 2009, with a total of 167 incidents that year.

Out of the control variables, none aside from travelers to Israel exhibits a significant relationship with the dependent variable. The logged travelers to Israel covariate shows a positive significant coefficient (0.488 at the 5% level), which corresponds to our initial correlation examination in Figure 9. This means that according to the model, for every annual 1% rise in travelers entering Israel from a certain country, there will be a 0.488% rise in antisemitic incidents in that country the following year.

Again, this covariate relationship and its direction raise questions as to the reasons why more tourists to Israel would be positively linked to higher rates of antisemitic incidents. A potential hint providing additional support for this result may come from the findings of the ADL's measurement of global antisemitic attitudes, which found that such attitudes are overall higher among people who have met Jews than among those who have never met Jews.[17] Thus, higher rates of travel to Israel may indeed have an explainable positive correlation with higher rates of antisemitism. Additionally, as per Medoff (1999), areas with more "liberal" ideologies had higher rates of recorded hate crimes due to a higher awareness of the issue; therefore, quite possibly, countries with higher travel rates to Israel may be more adept and serious about keeping track of antisemitic incidents, as they become more acquainted with Israel and Jewish people. Another explanation for the link between tourism to Israel and antisemitism may be

[17] The *ADL Global 100* found that worldwide, 30% of people who have met a Jew hold antisemitic views, compared with 27% of those who have never met a Jew (http://global100.adl.org/info/anti_semitism_info).

that a large portion of these travelers might be themselves Jewish, and therefore higher tourism to Israel may indeed point to a larger or more active Jewish community. As found by Gale, Heath and Ressler (2002), areas of higher Jewish population correlate with higher rates of hate crimes (largely against Jews); therefore, a rising Jewish population may indeed be linked to more antisemitic incidents.

The lack of additional significant relationships between the covariates and the dependent variable may stem from a number of reasons. First, there may problems in statistically substantiating the supporting theories on antisemitism and hate crimes, due to previously-mentioned differences in information-gathering among different countries and the potential existence of different strains of antisemitism, depending on the country in question. Additionally, the connection between the covariates and antisemitic incidents may be affected by interaction with other factors.

Panel Regression with Alternative Sample

To test the model's validity among different data sources and incident-reporting methods, we conducted a panel regression on an alternative sample of antisemitic incidents, which included United States figures from the ADL instead of the FBI (Table 2.2).[18] The goal was to examine how changes in reporting source might affect the overall results of the regression.

Although the coefficient for OIC migrants turns out slightly lower, it remains positive and significant at the 5% level, lending further credence to our model. Meanwhile, the travelers

[18] During the data collection process, we collected figures from a number of different sources and attempted to secure the best sample with the maximum number of observations for the panel. In the US, regular reporting of antisemitic incidents was provided officially by the FBI – which tracks annual hate crimes by group targeted – and "unofficially" by the ADL – which receives antisemitic incident reports from around the country (including those not necessarily classified as a hate crime by the government). Both sources provided reports for the full 15 years of the study, but the FBI figures were chosen for the primary sample due to their official nature and their compatibility with the "other" hate crimes statistics.

to Israel covariate drops to a 10% significance level in this sample, bringing some doubt regarding the original control variable's significance in its relationship with the dependent variable.

The similar results in the alternative data panel provide additional support to our original model, showing that even with slightly different figures, the significance and direction of the relationships between OIC migrants and antisemitic incidents remain the same.

Table 2.2: Panel OLS Alternative Sample - Effect of OIC Migrants on Antisemitic Incidents

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable: Ln(Alternative Antisemitic Incidents) (t + 1)						
OIC Migrants in thousands	0.377***	0.265**	0.263*	0.271**	0.271**	0.275**
	(0.113)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.133)
GDP Per Capita PPP in thousands of $		0.142	-0.235	-0.955	-0.969	-1.034
		(0.936)	(1.143)	(1.206)	(1.234)	(1.240)
Unemployment (%)			-0.0190	-0.00865	-0.00912	-0.0104
			(0.0328)	(0.0331)	(0.0342)	(0.0343)
Travelers to Israel in thousands				0.432*	0.430*	0.440*
				(0.249)	(0.255)	(0.256)
Right-Wing Government					-0.00392	-0.00804
					(0.0673)	(0.0677)
Election Year (Executive and/or Legislative)						-0.0523
						(0.0694)
Constant	4.399***	4.348+	5.747+	6.514+	6.576+	6.764+
	(0.413)	(3.291)	(4.091)	(4.079)	(4.234)	(4.249)
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	140	140	140	140	140	140
adj. R squared	0.00860	0.0628	0.0573	0.0736	0.0654	0.0618

Standard errors in parentheses
Significance levels: + p<0.2, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All continuous variables except for unemployment are natural log-transformed (OIC migrants, GDP per capita, Travelers to Israel)

Interaction Variables and Country Subcategories

Literature shows that a number of factors within a country may affect its acceptance and integration of migrants, as well as the decisions of potential migrants to enter a particular

country. These factors may include economic, political and sociocultural issues (Hatton and Williamson, 2002; Givens and Luedtke, 2005). These, along with additional elements, may potentially affect OIC migrants and lead to an impact on antisemitic incidents within a country. Table 3 tests a number of such potential interactions.

Table 3: Panel OLS – Interactions (GDP Per Capita, Travelers to Israel, Right-Wing Gov't)

Subcategory:	(1) GDP Per Capita	(2) 1-yr Lag (GDP Per Capita)	(3) Travelers to Israel	(4) Right-Wing Governing Party
Dependent Variable: Ln(Antisemitic Incidents) (t + 1)				
Interaction Variable	-0.2498	0.9258	1.216***	-0.971***
	(1.3013)	(1.3106)	(0.3267)	(0.3345)
OIC Migrants in thousands	2.047**	2.552***	1.047***	0.232*
	(0.9014)	(0.9242)	(0.2629)	(0.1260)
Interaction Term (OIC Migrants x Interaction Variable)	-0.493*	-0.627**	-0.203***	0.251***
	(0.2514)	(0.2574)	(0.0629)	(0.0885)
GDP Per Capita PPP in thousands			-3.057**	-0.729
			(1.2597)	(1.1742)
Unemployment (%)	-0.0285	-0.0138	-0.0453	0.0433
	(0.0345)	(0.0319)	(0.0339)	(0.0364)
Travelers to Israel in thousands	0.536**	0.641**		0.3287
	(0.2441)	(0.2621)		(0.2450)
Right-Wing Government	-0.0274	-0.0227	-0.0533	
	(0.0644)	(0.0637)	(0.0625)	
Election Year (Executive and/or Legislative)	-0.0545	-0.0357	-0.0557	-0.0421
	(0.0658)	(0.0646)	(0. 06397)	(0.0647)
Constant	3.478	-1.148	11.028***	5.992
	(4.522)	(4.405)	(4.066)	(3.991)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	140	130	140	140
adj. R squared	0.1294	0.1807	0.1768	0.1605

Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: + p<0.2, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All continuous variables except for unemployment are natural log-transformed (OIC migrants, GDP per capita, Travelers to Israel)

GDP Per Capita:

The first column of Table 3 presents an estimation of the effect of OIC migrants on antisemitic incidents in countries of different levels of GDP per capita, by looking at the interaction between OIC migrants and GDP per capita. Based on the coefficient of the interaction variable, a negative relationship is visible with a basic level of significance (at the 10% level), suggesting that countries with higher GDP per capita will on average experience slightly fewer antisemitic incidents following an influx of OIC migrants.

In Column 2, we looked at the interaction between the OIC migrants variable and the GDP per capita variable when subject to a one-year lag, in order to examine the potential relationship between a country's GDP per capita in the previous year and the current year's OIC migrants, and how it affects antisemitic incidents in the following year. The negative and significant (at the 5% level) coefficient on the interaction variable strengthens our understanding of the interaction between GDP per capita and OIC migrants. This analysis suggests that countries which had a higher GDP per capita in the year preceding an influx of OIC migrants will experience slightly fewer antisemitic incidents in the following year.

It should be noted that in neither of these tests does the indicator variable turn up significant. Whether due to the inadequate sample size or other issues, it is important to keep this in mind when analyzing the interaction effect.

Based on these analyses, it may be that countries with higher GDP per capita are more attentive and thus proactive in addressing the potential for antisemitic activity in light of heightened OIC immigration, whether by the migrants themselves or by extreme nativist elements in the country.

Relationship with Israel – Travelers:

Column 3 of Table 3 presents an estimation of the effect of OIC migrants on antisemitic incidents in countries with different numbers of travelers to Israel, by looking at the interaction

between OIC migrants and travelers to Israel. Based on the analysis, a positive significant coefficient tells us that the variable of travelers to Israel correlates positively with antisemitic incidents in the following year. Meanwhile, the interaction variable's negative and significant coefficient (at the 1% level) suggests that countries with higher rates of travel to Israel will on average experience a slight decrease in antisemitic incidents following an influx of OIC migrants. Based on this, it may be that countries with higher rates of travel to Israel (and on a proxy level, having a better relationship with Israel) – similarly to countries with higher GDP per capita – are more attentive and proactive in addressing the potential for antisemitic activity in light of heightened OIC immigration.

Right-Wing Governing Party:

In Column 4 of Table 3, we see the interaction estimating the effect of OIC migrants on antisemitic incidents in countries with governments led by right-wing parties. We see a negative significant coefficient (at the 1% level) showing an overall negative link between right-wing governments and antisemitic incidents. Meanwhile, the interaction variable has a positive and significant (at the 1% level) coefficient, meaning that under right-wing governments, an influx of OIC migrants will on average lead to a rise in antisemitic incidents the following year.

This relationship requires some interpretation. One potential explanation may be found in the traditional understandings of right-wing politics. Thus, on the one hand, if, as described by Porat (2016), many antisemitic incidents (especially violent ones) in developed countries are perpetrated by individuals of Muslim background, and if we assume that right-wing governments restrict immigration from OIC countries, we then understand why right-wing governments would see a negative connection with antisemitic incidents. Then, as found by Givens and Luedtke (2005), right-wing governments tend to implement more restrictive integration laws for new immigrants, limiting those immigrants' rights or freedoms in one way

or another. Thus, as new OIC migrants come in to a country under a right-wing government, they may begin feeling isolated or marginalized due to such laws, as they gradually lose the connection to their cultures and begin experiencing discrimination in their new countries, which may lead to radicalization – something that may gain expression through antisemitic activity (Lyons-Padilla et. al, 2015).

On the other hand, the right-wing governments in question are largely center-right and do not explicitly oppose immigration. Thus, another scenario is that under such governments a mobilization may occur amongst far-right activists who see continued immigration and thus perceive their leaders to be a "pro-immigration elite" (Ravndal, 2017). This extremist mobilization of xenophobic forces may also spur the growth of antisemitic activity.

Robustness Tests

Here we present a number of robustness tests for the original regression analysis as presented in Table 2.1. These tests are summarized in Table 4.1 (page 62). We vary the sample, as well as testing an alternative measure for OIC migrants – namely, the percentage of OIC migrants out of the total incoming migrant population for each country, as presented initially in Table 1.4. Additionally, to verify the uniqueness of the connection specifically between OIC migrants and antisemitic incidents, we also test an alternative, opposing independent variable – *non-OIC migrants*.[19]

Prior to examining the results of this analysis, it should be noted that a number of the regressions in the subsequent table use smaller sub-samples, some of which cut the original sample by more than two-thirds. Therefore, caution should be used when making absolute

[19] The logged non-OIC migrants variable was created by subtracting the OIC migrants from the total incoming migrants for each country in the sample, and implementing a natural log transformation on the resulting figure, measured in thousands of migrants. As with OIC migrants, these figures were acquired through the OECD International Migration Database.

conclusions from the results of these robustness tests. Nevertheless, the following tests do contribute to our understanding of the model and the phenomenon we are examining.

Column 1 portrays the basic specification from Table 2.1, measuring the log transformed number of OIC migrants (by the thousands) for the full sample. In Column 2 and 3, we narrow the sample down to those countries which had a mean annual intake of, respectively, fewer than and greater than 61,000 OIC migrants, which was the variable's mean for the full sample. The reason we divided and examined the sample in this manner is that previous research has shown that larger influxes of Muslim migrants are not necessarily linked to rising antisemitism (Berek, 2018). Additionally, research has shown that the major risk for radicalization among Muslim immigrants occurs in countries which do not effectively integrate these migrants; therefore, countries with more experience absorbing large numbers of such migrants will potentially see a lower connection between OIC migrants and antisemitic incidents (Padilla et. al, 2015; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Gould and Klor, 2016).

The results of Columns 2 and 3 seem to confirm these points. For countries with a mean of under 61,000 migrants, the OIC migrants coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level, exhibiting a robust positive connection with subsequent antisemitic incidents. Meanwhile, for countries with a mean of more than 61,000 OIC migrants, the coefficient is not significant, meaning that there is no significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables for countries accepting larger numbers of OIC migrants.

In Columns 4 and 5, we examine the robustness of the model when isolated to European and non-European countries. As most of the literature detailing Muslim antisemitic actions focuses on Europe and the situation of the continent's relatively small Jewish communities, we chose to examine the model within this context (Gerstenfeld, 2013; Jikeli, 2013 and 2016; Kaplan and Small, 2006). From the analysis, we find a positive and significant coefficient (at the 1% level) for OIC migrants to the European countries in the sample, and simultaneously

no significant link with OIC migrants to the non-European countries in the sample. This confirms that there is a meaningful difference between the phenomena of OIC immigration to the European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK) versus to the non-European countries (Australia, Canada, US) in the sample.

In Columns 6-8, we use a new interpretation of the independent OIC migrants variable, taking the percentage of OIC migrants out of the total incoming migrant population for each country (as initially presented in Table 1.4). In this way, we are able to focus not on the absolute number of OIC migrants, but rather on their share of the total incoming migrant population in a given year. In Column 6, we see that for the complete sample, the OIC migrants variable is positive and significant at the 1% level, displaying its robustness to different measurements of the independent variable. This means that a higher percentage of OIC migrants relates positively to antisemitic incidents the following year.

In Column 7, for the sub-sample of European countries, the coefficient is slightly higher and remains positive and significant at the 1% level, confirming our analysis of the European situation concerning OIC migrants and antisemitic incidents – where there is a greater influence of a higher percentages of OIC migrants on antisemitic incidents. Then, in Column 8, for the examination of the non-European sample, we find a negative coefficient for OIC migrants, significant at the 5% level. Here, the analysis provides an additional view of the difference between European and non-European countries for our study, linking a higher percentage of OIC migrants in non-European countries to a drop in antisemitic incidents the following year. The reasons for this may include different (possibly more/less selective) immigration or integration policies between European and non-European countries, a different (and less particularistic) local culture and identity, and slightly different understandings of diversity.

The final robustness test implemented is a falsification test using the opposing independent variable: the logged number of non-OIC migrants. This analysis, as seen in

Column 9, allows us to verify that the relationship between migrants and antisemitic incidents is unique to OIC migrants, rather than those coming from other countries. In fact, the lack of a significant coefficient for this specification supports our hypothesis of a specific connection between OIC migrants and antisemitic incidents. Thus, based on this analysis, OIC migrants are correlated with future antisemitic incidents, while non-OIC migrants are not.

Through the aforementioned analyses, we see that the model is robust for an alternative measure of OIC migrants, and specifically for countries in Europe and those which accept a lower multi-year mean of OIC migrants. The observed relationship in the model is also not applicable to all migrants, but rather specific to those from OIC countries. Meanwhile, the model's robustness suffers in countries accepting the largest mean OIC migrants, as well as countries outside of the European region.

Table 4.1: Panel OLS- Migrants Variable Variations

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Dependent Variable: Ln(Antisemitic Incidents) (t + 1)									
Migrants Variable	OIC Migrants	OIC Migrants	OIC Migrants	OIC Migrants	OIC Migrants	% OIC from Total	% OIC from Total	% OIC from Total	Non-OIC Migrants
Sample Countries	Full Sample	Mean < 61K	Mean > 61K	Europe	Non-Europe	Full Sample	Europe	Non-Europe	Full Sample
Migrants	0.297**	0.430***	-0.0803	0.423***	-0.588+	0.0189***	0.0277***	-0.0813**	-0.1080
	(0.128)	(0.159)	(0.281)	(0.142)	(0.394)	(0.00678)	(0.00713)	(0.0292)	(0.1792)
GDP Per Capita PPP in thousands	-1.346	-3.383**	2.444	-1.521	1.684	-1.087	-1.503	-0.809	-1.464
	(1.190)	(1.440)	(2.896)	(1.401)	(2.569)	(1.188)	(1.346)	(2.505)	(1.258)
Unemployment (%)	-0.00604	-0.0780	0.0580	0.0198	-0.00299	-0.0229	-0.0142	0.0234	-0.0124
	(0.0329)	(0.0605)	(0.0693)	(0.0392)	(0.0653)	(0.0330)	(0.0386)	(0.0595)	(0.0342)
Travelers to Israel in thousands	0.488**	0.760**	-0.229	0.612**	0.299	0.266	0.273	0.0532	0.4113
	(0.246)	(0.346)	(0.418)	(0.272)	(0.985)	(0.253)	(0.270)	(0.832)	(0.267)
Right-Wing Government	-0.0380	-0.0976	0.162	-0.228***	0.258**	-0.0629	-0.277***	0.238**	-0.045
	(0.0650)	(0.106)	(0.126)	(0.0817)	(0.0990)	(0.0648)	(0.0805)	(0.0890)	(0.0668)
Election Year (Exec and/or Legislative)	-0.0527	-0.0997	-0.00437	-0.106	-0.0320	-0.0532	-0.103	-0.0409	-0.0462
	(0.0666)	(0.0967)	(0.0976)	(0.0862)	(0.0996)	(0.0659)	(0.0829)	(0.0891)	(0.068)
Constant	7.507*	13.32***	-0.606	6.877+	1.669	8.154**	8.940	10.10+	9.785**
	(4.080)	(4.766)	(10.96)	(4.761)	(7.284)	(3.965)	(4.460)	(7.362)	(4.052)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	140	84	56	98	42	140	98	42	140
adj. R squared	0.107	0.278	-0.274	0.237	0.183	0.125	0.292	0.345	0.067

Mean < or > 61K refers to countries with an overall annual mean of OIC migrants greater than or less than 61,000, which is the overall mean number of OIC migrants for the sample. % OIC from Total refers to percentage of OIC migrants coming in, out of total incoming migrants. All continuous variables except for unemployment and % OIC from total migrants are natural log-transformed (OIC and non-OIC migrants, GDP per capita, Travelers to Israel).
Significance levels: + p<0.2, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors are in parentheses.

Alternative Antisemitism Measure – Incidents by Population

An additional test is conducted to examine the model's robustness for an alternative measure of antisemitic incidents, which measured incidents by population (using the variable initially presented in Table 1.2). The dependent variable was replaced by this indicator, expressed as the number of antisemitic incidents per 1 million people for each country in the sample. The results are displayed in Table 4.2, when measured against two variations of the independent variable (logged OIC migrants and percent OIC out of total migrants).

Table 4.2: Panel OLS- The Effect of OIC Migrants on Antisemitic Incidents by Population

Variable	(1)	(2)
Dependent Variable: Ln(Antisemitic Incidents by 1M Population) (t + 1)		
Migrants Variable	OIC Migrants	% OIC from Total
Migrants	0.280**	0.018***
	(0.127)	(0.0068)
GDP Per Capita PPP in thousands	-1.332	-1.086
	(1.184)	(1.184)
Unemployment (%)	-0.00950	-0.0254
	(0.0328)	(0.0328)
Travelers to Israel in thousands	0.484*	0.2745
	(0.245)	(0.2525)
Right-Wing Government	-0.0294	-0.05285
	(0.0646)	(0.0645)
Election Year (Executive and/or Legislative)	-0.0523	-0.05281
	(0.0663)	(0.0657)
Constant	4.137	4.742
	(4.059)	(3.948)
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N	140	140
adj. R squared	0.0664	0.0836

Standard errors in parentheses
Significance levels: + p<0.2, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All continuous variables except for unemployment and % OIC from total migrants are natural log-transformed (OIC migrants, GDP per capita, Travelers to Israel)

Table 4.2 supports the robustness of the study's model, as seen through the positive and significant (to the 5% level) coefficient for OIC migrants in Column 1, as well as the positive and significant (to the 1% level) coefficient for the migrants measure in Column 2.

The coefficient for the logged OIC migrants variable in Column 1, at 0.280, is very slightly smaller than the coefficient of the original model in Table 2.1 (at 0.297) and maintains an identical level of significance. We understand through this model that for each 1% rise in OIC migrants entering a country, there is an approximate subsequent 0.280% rise in antisemitic incidents per 1 million population in the following year.

Examined in context, we can look at France in the year 2013, when OIC migrants rose by approximately 5%. Under such circumstances, the estimated effect of this rise would be an approximately 1.4% rise in antisemitic incidents per 1 million population in 2014, meaning an increase from 6.409 incidents per million population to 6.499 incidents per million.[20]

Column 2 of Table 4.2 further supports the robustness of our model by displaying the strong connection between a high percentage of OIC migrants to a country (out of total incoming migrants) and the subsequent increase of antisemitic incidents by 1 million population in the following year. According to this analysis, an increase by 1 percentage point in OIC migrants out of total migrants coming into a country predicts a subsequent estimated 1.8% rise in antisemitic incidents by 1million population in that country for the following year. Thus, we see a strong relationship between the proportion of Muslim-origin migrants and the subsequent rate of antisemitic incidents in a country.

[20] The actual rise in incidents per million in France in 2014 was much more dramatic, increasing from 6.409 to 12.832 antisemitic incidents per million population. There were likely numerous causes for this jump, and the Israel-Hamas Gaza conflict (Operation Cast Lead) of July-August 2014 may well have been an influential factor.

Panel Regressions Testing Total Hate Crimes

Hate Crimes Data:

Due to our interest in comparing antisemitic incidents to other types of hate crimes, general statistics on hate crimes were also gathered. This data was gathered from governments of the countries involved, for each year in question.[21] From this data, we subtracted each country's figure for antisemitic incidents, creating a statistic that includes all hate crimes except for antisemitic incidents. The resulting variable of non-antisemitic hate crimes was tested along with total hate crimes as an alternative dependent variable in order to determine the relationship between the OIC migrants and these phenomena, and to examine the differences between antisemitic incidents and other hate crimes.

Due to a lack in availability or reliability of such data for a large number of the countries involved (stemming from problems with internal information-gathering or an absence of publishable material), the final sample of countries including this variable was cut down to just six.

It is important to note here that due to sometimes varying sources between the hate crimes statistics and the antisemitism figures, the non-antisemitic incidents variable is more of an estimate than an exact representation of non-antisemitic hate crimes. Some of the antisemitic incidents reported in a country may not have been classified as hate crimes in the official government report, and additionally there exist varying definitions for such crimes by country. Additionally, many of the dilemmas presented under the discussion of the main dependent variable (antisemitic incidents) are also applicable in the case of hate crimes reporting – such as issues with under- and over-reporting.

[21] Data gathered from: Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, Belgian National Police, French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, and US Federal Bureau of Investigation. More details on sources are provided in "Sources for Antisemitism and Hate Crimes Data".

Table 5.1: Summary Statistics – Hate Crimes

		Hate Crimes				Ln(Hate Crimes)			
Variable	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
Total Hate Crimes	90	3203.111	3661.993	209	10373	7.6084	1.0665	5.3423	9.247
Non-Antisemitic Hate Crimes	90	2673.589	2376.7	201	9007	7.3795	1.1094	5.3033	9.1058

Table 5.1 presents a summary of the total hate crimes variable and the non-antisemitic hate crimes variable, both in their original forms and in the normalized natural log transformation of each variable, which is the form used in the subsequent regressions. Within the six countries for which statistics exist, the mean number of hate crimes stands at 3,203 (and a mean log value of 7.6), while mean non-antisemitic hate crimes for the given years stand at approximately 2,674 hate crimes (with a mean log value of 7.38). With very large standard deviations (at 3,662 and 2,376.7, respectively) and vast ranges, these variables – just like the antisemitic incidents variable before them – give rise to the questions about data gathering and legal definitions which were brought up earlier in this study. Meanwhile, the skewedness in the non-logged values is taken care of through the natural logged values of the variables.

As seen in the literature reviews at the beginning of this study, the research on general hate crimes and antisemitic incidents has highlighted the similarities between the phenomena, while occasionally emphasizing the unique nature of antisemitism as opposed to other types of hate. With regards to immigration, rising hate crime crimes have been discussed in the context of increasing migration into developed countries, although it has also been noted that the link between immigration and anti-immigrant hate crimes remains speculative (OSCE, 2015; Shively et. al., 2014). However, in this context the initial relationship between rising OIC immigration and hate crimes was expected to be similar to that between the independent variable and antisemitic incidents.

Regression Analysis:

Due to our added interest in comparing the phenomena of antisemitic incidents and hate crimes in general, and the desire to find a potential answer for whether a rise in OIC migrants is linked to a rise only in antisemitic incidents, or if it is also linked to a rise in overall hate crimes, we tested regressions with alternative dependent variables: logged total hate crimes and logged non-antisemitic hate crimes (Table 5.2). For each of these alternative dependent variables, we also tested two separate main independent variables (OIC migrants and non-OIC migrants) along with the rest of the standard covariates.

Table 5.2: Panel OLS - Effect of Migrants on Total and Non-Antisemitic Hate Crimes

	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Ln(Total Hate Crimes) (t + 1)		
OIC Migrants	0.0577	
	(0.130)	
Non-OIC Migrants		0.398**
		(0.153)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N	84	84
adj. R squared	0.380	0.442
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Ln(Non-Antisemitic Hate Crimes) (t + 1)		
OIC Migrants	0.00799	
	(0.160)	
Non-OIC Migrants		0.773***
		(0.171)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N	84	84
adj. R squared	0.300	0.481

Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: + p<0.2, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Control variables include the standard covariates: GDP per capita PPP (in thousands of dollars), unemployment (in %), travelers to Israel (in thousands), right-wing governing party and election year.
All continuous variables except for unemployment are natural log-transformed (OIC and non-OIC migrants, GDP per capita, Travelers to Israel).

With the dependent variable switched to total hate crimes (Panel A), we see in Column 1 an absence of a significant coefficient for the OIC migrants variable. With no visible relationship between OIC migrants and subsequent total hate crimes, we notice a difference between this analysis and that for antisemitic incidents. However, when our migrant indicator is switched to those coming from non-OIC countries (Column 2), the coefficient becomes significant at the 5% level and portrays a positive connection between non-OIC migrants and subsequent hate crimes.

When we test the model using a dependent variable of non-antisemitic hate crimes (Panel B), the results are even more dramatic. For incoming OIC migrants (Column 1), here too no significant relationship was found, and in fact the coefficient turned out even smaller. With the independent variable of interest switched to non-OIC migrants, however (Column 2), we found a significant positive relationship between these migrants and subsequent non-antisemitic hate crimes – this time with a much larger coefficient and significant at the 1% level.

Through these analyses, we understand that, within the constraints of the limited existing sample, rising rates of OIC migrants have no overall estimated relationship with total hate crimes or non-antisemitic hate crimes. The lack of correlation between the log variables of total hate crimes/non-antisemitic hate crimes and OIC migrants was surprising given documented circumstantial evidence in a number of countries showing rising violence and bias-driven activity towards migrants in general and Muslims in particular.[22] On the other hand, the strong correlations with non-OIC migrants point to the existence of a relationship between non-Muslim migration and rising non-antisemitic hate crimes, as rising rates of non-OIC migrants are very strongly correlated with rising non-antisemitic hate crimes.

[22] See, for example, EU Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA (2016), *Current migration situation in the EU: hate crime*. The report presents increased anti-migrant activity in Germany, Netherlands, Finland and Greece and growing anti-Muslim sentiment throughout Europe. Found at: file:///Users/Tomer/Downloads/fra-2016-november-monthly-focus-hate-crime_en.pdf .

These results lend support to the uniqueness of the connection between OIC migration and antisemitism, as opposed to other hate crimes. We find the non-OIC migrants' relationship, on the other hand, to be uniquely tied to non-antisemitic hate crimes, as opposed to their lack of relationship with antisemitic incidents (as seen in Table 4.1, Column 9). These indications reinforce the speculation of Muslim antisemitism as the factor at play when antisemitic incidents rise in the wake of OIC migration.

However, one must use caution when making such assumptions, as attention should be paid to the sample in question. As discussed earlier, comprehensive hate crimes figures were only successfully gathered from six countries for the time period in question. This limited sample undoubtedly affects the reliability of such examinations, although they still provide a view into potential behaviors and trends.

Conclusion

After an initial historical review of antisemitism which presented the origins and development of the phenomenon, and the subsequent substantial literature reviews of theories on hate crimes and antisemitism, which established a context for discussing and exploring the issue, this study tested the relationship between hate crimes and incoming migrants from Muslim countries, a variable often claimed to be tied to the "new antisemitism".

Through basic econometric analysis, this study finds that incoming migrants from Muslim countries are correlated positively with future antisemitic incidents in their OECD countries of arrival. This finding serves to substantiate concerns and increase awareness among policymakers and law enforcement regarding the effectiveness of immigration and integration policies on the one hand, and fighting bigotry and hate on the other.

The observed relationship was especially evident among the European countries in the sample, and it was robust for an alternative data set for US figures. The model was also robust both when migrants from Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries were measured by the thousands and when they were measured as a proportion of the total arriving migrants. This means that for the sample as a whole, and especially for European countries, we found a positive correlation between incoming OIC migrants and subsequent antisemitic incidents, as well as a positive correlation between high percentages of immigrants from OIC countries and subsequent antisemitic incidents. This relationship was found to be specific to OIC migrants and was nonexistent in tests for non-OIC migrants.

Somewhat oddly, countries with lower mean numbers of OIC immigrants exhibited a stronger relationship between the incoming OIC migrants and subsequent antisemitism, whereas countries with higher mean numbers of OIC migrants lacked this link.

At the same time, the findings were also robust for antisemitic incidents per 1 million population, displaying significant positive relationships for a rise in OIC migrants and percent OIC migrants on the one hand, and subsequent antisemitic incidents per million population on the other.

We also found a number of interaction variables that help us understand the nature and behavior of this relationship. Countries with higher GDP per capita prior to an influx of OIC migrants will subsequently most likely experience slightly fewer antisemitic incidents. Countries with more travelers to Israel will likewise tend to experience slightly fewer antisemitic incidents following an influx of OIC migrants. Meanwhile, countries with a right-wing governing party, although overall likely to experience slightly fewer antisemitic incidents than under a non-right-wing government, will nevertheless potentially experience *more* such incidents following an influx of OIC migrants.

When the dependent variable was switched from antisemitic incidents to total hate crimes and non-antisemitic hate crimes, we found that the influence of migrants from Muslim countries acted in a manner opposite to that of the antisemitic incidents – non-antisemitic hate crimes were positively correlated with a preceding influx of non-OIC migrants, but showed no relationship with the arrival of migrants from OIC countries.

The uniqueness of the positive connection between OIC-origin migrants and subsequent antisemitic incidents supports our hypothesis and gives backing to theories studying the "new antisemitism" in the developed world, which link the phenomenon in part to a growth in Muslim communities, some of which may be importing certain antisemitic trends prevalent in Muslim countries (as discussed and evidenced in Rubenstein, 2008; Weitzman, 2008; Kahn, 2008; Pew Research Center, 2011; ADL, 2014).

On the public policy scale, this study helps to increase knowledge and point governments and researchers in a potential direction towards addressing issues regarding immigration, social cohesiveness and hate crime. While somewhat alarming, the results point to an issue which needs to be dealt with in a cautious and prudent manner.

It is important to mention that this study does not take a position on how best to address this issue, nor is it our desire to target any particular group as such. Rather, the purpose is to find an empirical basis for one aspect of a complicated phenomenon which has been increasingly worrying Jewish communities and law enforcement agencies across Europe and other regions which have experienced antisemitism and other forms of hate activity.

There are a number of directions for continued research on this subject, as well as gaps to be filled. One policy issue that can be studied is an examination of varying absorption and integration policies in and outside of Europe and how they affect the link between OIC migrants and antisemitism. Additionally, it may be important to determine the role of nativist extremists

in OECD countries versus that of groups of newcomers in perpetrating antisemitic incidents, and it is important to be able to distinguish which groups perpetrate what kinds of acts.

Further data on total hate crimes and non-antisemitic hate crimes is needed in order to better understand the relationships between these phenomena and antisemitic incidents, and the relationship between groups of incoming migrants and these variables.

Another important gap in data is an empirical, alternative measure of antisemitism. In addition to incidents, an annual, representative measure of attitudes among a large number of countries would be helpful in creating alternative research and substantiating results.

Additionally, as put forth by a number of previous researchers and as regularly discussed in roundtables on this issue, it is crucially important to expand the pool of countries that collect reliable and consistent data, and to minimize the influence of under-reporting and over-reporting. Similarly, a more uniform reporting system which can combine the experiences of different countries and provide them with an effective way of monitoring such incidents would be helpful on a policy and a research level.

Finally, since 2015, there have been huge spikes in antisemitic incidents and overall hate crimes, whether in Europe, the US or around the world (Anti-Defamation League, 2018; Community Security Trust, 2018; Eichner, 2018; John, 2017). These have been nominally tied to different factors, from rising far-right populist forces to left-wing radicalism and Islamist attacks. Statistics from the last few years are necessary to expand the current study and be able to cover the current situation among the sample countries. Such research could attempt to reexamine OIC migration and add additional variables, such as indicators of extremist politics, and check their relationship with antisemitism and hate crimes.

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Appendix:

1. Antisemitic Incidents:

	Argentina (DAIA)	Australia (ECAJ)*	Austria (Federal Ministry of the Interior)	Belgium (Federal Police)	Canada (B'nai Brith)	France (CNCDH)	Germany (BMI)	Netherlands (CIDI)	Sweden (BRA)	UK (CST)	US (FBI)	US (ADL)
2001	185	362	3	30	286	219	1629	168	102	310	1043	1432
2002	149	593	20	62	459	936	1594	359	102	350	931	1559
2003	177	541	9	28	584	601	1226	334	105	375	927	1557
2004	174	445	17	46	857	974	1346	327	151	532	954	1821
2005	373	328	8	60	829	508	1682	159	111	459	848	1757
2006	586	442	8	66	935	571	1662	261	134	598	967	1554
2007	348	638	15	69	1042	402	1561	104	118	561	969	1460
2008	302	652	23	73	1135	397	1496	108	159	546	1013	1352
2009	503	962	12	109	1264	832	1690	167	250	929	931	1211
2010	256	390	27	52	1306	466	1268	124	161	645	887	1239
2011	126	517	16	65	1297	389	1239	112	194	609	771	1080
2012	243	543	27	80	1345	614	1374	96	221	650	674	927
2013	236	657	37	64	1274	423	1275	100	193	535	625	751
2014	308	762	58	109	1627	851	1596	171	267	1,182	609	912
2015	478	640	41	70	1277	808	1366	126	277	960	664	941

*The methodology used by the Executive Council on Australian Jewry in compiling the annual antisemitic incident report was changed from 2014 onward, to exclude the double counting of "circular-type emails" with antisemitic content which may have been forwarded to more than one recipient. After consultation with Julie Nathan, Research Officer at ECAJ, the estimates for these emails were kept within the total incidents for the years 2014 and 2015, in order to prevent a departure from the standard methodology in use since 2001.

2. Definition of Antisemitism:

This definition of antisemitism was initially adopted by the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, now the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), in 2005. It has become the standard accepted definition around the world, being adopted by governments throughout Europe and the US, as well as numerous national and international organizations.

WORKING DEFINITION OF ANTISEMITISM

The purpose of this document is to provide a practical guide for identifying incidents, collecting data, and supporting the implementation and enforcement of legislation dealing with antisemitism.

Working definition: **"Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities."**

In addition, such manifestations could also target the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for "why things go wrong." It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).

- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.

Examples of the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard to the State of Israel taking into account the overall context could include:

- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.

Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law (for example, denial of the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic materials in some countries).

Criminal acts are antisemitic when the targets of attacks, whether they are people or property – such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries – are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or linked to Jews.

Antisemitic discrimination is the denial to Jews of opportunities or services available to others and is illegal in many countries.

Source:

Working definition of Antisemitism, <http://www.ep-wgas.eu/about/mission/>, (accessed 15 January 2017, original document published in 2005 by EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia).

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