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Lobbying in Israel

ANALYSIS OF THIRD SECTOR LOBBYING IN ISRAEL

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Abstract

Groups influencing policy makers is nothing new. Interest groups have been lobbying and influencing governments for millennia. Therefore, grasping how lobbying groups influence the political agenda is imperative for understanding democracy and representation in general. The goal of this thesis is to discuss public interest lobbying in Israel—lobbying carried out by third sector organizations. This includes all non-profit organizations and NGOs—any organization claiming to represent the voice of the people. It may include think-tanks, social welfare organizations, educational institutions, etc. This paper aims to answer two questions:

- 1) What was the institutional logic that underlined Israel's regulation of lobbying?
- 2) What were the practical consequences of this institutional logic?

This research will address how Israeli legislators view lobbying and how that impacted the shift following the 2008 law. Not only are the results themselves impressive, but Israeli law's theoretical framework for lobbying will be used to explain the lack of legislative oversight on third sector lobbying and the significance of that lack of oversight.

This paper is not designed to limit or disregard any of the important work non-profits do in Israel nor does it aim to besmirch traditional lobbyists. Rather, it aims to shed light on an almost never-researched arena. It will be the first of its kind in Israel, and it aims to highlight that a new unregulated sub-industry has been created due to the 2008 law: third sector lobbying.

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Chapter 1: Introduction:

In the 2005 film *Thank you for Smoking*, in which a tobacco industry spokesperson is depicted as lobbying by utilizing ‘data’ from a research institute in order to push through pro-tobacco policies in Congress. At one point, lobbyists are even referred to as the Merchants of Death. While satirical, the film highlights the way the majority of the public views lobbyists: negatively. Lobbyists tend to develop a bad reputation in the media and public opinion¹--lobbyists are often associated with “manipulation, corruption, bribery” and other negative connotations. A Gallup poll conducted every year since 2002, more than 60% of Americans consider lobbyists “to have low or very low ethical standards”—lower than salespeople, members of Congress and lawyers. In Israel, lobbyists are subject to a negative public opinion as well². These perceptions are despite the fact many lobbying regulations are widespread in democracies. This thesis will focus on Israel’s 2008 Lobbying Law, its theoretical frameworks, the results of the law, as well as its importance to the foundation of understanding lobbying regulations. Furthermore, this work zooms in on the third sector lobbying in Israel – that was excluded from the 2008 law, creating a significant lack in legislative oversight – and offers transparency of this deeply opaque lobbying behavior.

While traditional lobbying research highlights three different frameworks to understand lobbying activities, this paper will outline four alternative views of the logic underlying lobbying as well as the risks entailed in each and the needed regulatory response. Analyzing Israel’s 2008 lobbying law that sought to regulate lobbying, this thesis set tow study two research questions:

- 1) What was the institutional logic that underlined Israel’s regulation of lobbying?

¹ <http://www.aalep.eu/dispelling-negative-perceptions-about-lobbying>

² Examples of articles

2) What were the practical consequences of this institutional logic?

The conclusions of this thesis establish a new theoretical framework to understand lobbying and provides key insight into a mostly overlooked area of public policy in Israel.

There is very little academic research on lobbying in Israel. While there are few policy papers and there are researchers working on a Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) coding book to code Knesset hearings more efficiently and uniformly, but there is very little research addressing lobbying specifically in an in-depth manner. All academic research concentrating on Israeli lobbying is qualitative, such as interviewing lobbyists or elected officials. Furthermore, of the limited research on lobbying in Israel, all focus on macro level trends, without going into details on specific sectors. Research on private sector lobbying is quite superficial, all the more so regarding Israel's third sector. In fact, I found no academic research on the third sector lobbying in Israel to date. This is particularly interesting given how much research exists on other aspects of Israel's third sector, such a fund raising, changes in structure and more.

The literature review will develop a coherent typology, based on extant research, of four institutional logics underlying regulation of lobbying. The typology will include four dimensions in relation to each of the four approaches:

- What is lobbying?
- Who is considered a lobbyist?
- What are the perceived risks?
- What would regulation look like?
- Provide a concrete example.

The empirical aims of this work are to gauge the institutional logic of Israel's lobbying regulation, measure the history and consequences of Israeli 2008 regulation against this typology, and show that it manifests a different institutional logic, which has shaped its unique consequences. The effect of the 2008 on third sector lobbying in Israel will be empirically demonstrated by comparing Economic Committee hearings two years prior to the passage of the law and two years following. These comparisons will reveal the significance of the current Israeli law on a practical level as pertaining to the third sector. It will demonstrate that following the law, third sector lobbying increased significantly at the expense of the commercial sector. The research will support the creation of a new theoretical dichotomy for framing lobbying regulations: Action-Based regulation and Motivation Based Regulations. It will conclude with the discussing the further research opportunities and the potential social impact of this research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter will provide an overview of the lobbying research and regulations. Current research suggests alternative conceptions for what is entailed in lobbying and how each manifest itself in distinct regulatory arrangements. Following an overview of the research, a new typology will be built of the institutional logic underlying different models of lobbying regulations.

There are traditionally three theoretical frameworks to understand lobbying, Exchange, Transmission of Information, and Legislative Subsidy. In addition to these, this review includes a fourth framework on Private-Public interest lobbying. Each section will include a brief summary of the framework, its risks, what a regulation would look like under this framework, and provide a real world example. The empirical analysis will show that the Israeli 2008 law is best explained by the fourth logic, and the consequences of it will be further explored.

Divergent Logics of Lobbying

“Scholars show no consensus on what they mean by lobbying” (p.35) (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). However, lobbying is generally viewed as aiming to “influence public policy” (p.34) (Mahoney, 2007). Interest groups are designed to represent diverse groups that “voice their concerns in the media and lobby politicians and seek access to bureaucrats” (p.3) (Christiansen, Pederson, & Binderkrantz, 2014). Interest groups participate in all parts of the political process from formation to implementation (Berghagen & Trani, 2012), attempting to influence all relevant decision makers (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). The broad definition aims to incorporate the vast field and wide political arena. While this can be a positive attribute, it has also created confusion for researchers and could be one of the reasons that the findings of research on lobbying are often “mixed” and incompatible with one another (Burstein & Hirsch, 2007). The overall definition of lobbying is broad and can include many different types of organization, broadly speaking, lobbyists are those that attempt to influence legislators and policy makers on a regular basis, as opposed to private constituents reaching out to their representatives.

While many people understand what lobbying is practically, this thesis suggests that underlying extant research are distinct assumptions as to what is entailed in lobbying, who is to be seen as a lobbyist, what risks are posed by lobbying to democracy, and therefore what are the required means to mitigate them. Below I identify three institutional logics: Exchange; Transmission of Information; Legislative Subsidy (You, 2017), and show how these translate into distinct understanding of who is a lobbyist and into divergent regulatory arrangements. Thereafter, I will empirically demonstrate that the Israeli 2008 law manifested yet another institutional logic, with clear ramifications for its practical effect.

Lobbying as an Exchange

The exchange theory refers to the idea that lobbyists buy votes in exchange for certain legislation being pass or shelved (Dekel, Jackson, & Wolinsky, 2009). Essentially, “the lobbyist gets full control of the vote in exchange for an up-front payment to the legislator” (Dekel, Jackson, & Wolinsky, 2009 p.4). In this context, payments are typically “written into the bill itself” usually as “special conditions, allowances, exemptions, transition rules, and so on (p.4)” (Groseclose & Snyder, 1996). However, lobbyists can also make promises—such as political support or future donations to a political campaign—conditional on the success of the lobbying (i.e., if the lobbyist’s desired outcome is met). Furthermore, lobbyists may even make promises to the constituency of legislators (Dekel, Jackson, & Wolinsky, 2009).

While the exchange may seem dangerous at first glance, researchers postulate that it in fact increases efficiency (Dekel, Jackson, & Wolinsky, 2009). Without this type of exchange, “there is simply nothing to make legislators take into account the effect of their vote on others” (p.14). Furthermore, since there is inherent competition between lobbyists, a legislators’ votes will ultimately align with social values. In short, the exchanges will even out across the board and will not favor one political agenda over another when looking at the totality of the picture.

In this approach, a lobbyist could be anyone trying to influence an elected official in exchange for an activity, done in juxtaposition to the outcome or later. This typically includes political support in a future campaign, campaign donations, rallying voters, special exemptions in bill, etc. Examples may include a business, political supporters, Political Action Committees, non-profit organizations and more. The focus on this approach is on the framing of the influence: Elected Official A will support initiative B in exchange for an action by lobbyist C. It does not differentiate

between types of lobbyists or the reasoning of their actions, which as we will see is the logic that underlies the 2008 Israeli law on lobbying.

The risks of the Exchange Approach are mainly that it gives those lobbyists with more resources and influence the highest likelihood of successes. In this model, lobbyists who deliver more are successful, while those who are limited are less. The second aspect is that a gift is in the eye of the beholder—while monetary gifts are easy to quantify, endorsements or rallying supports may be worth fact more. Furthermore, it works off of the assumption that elected officials are only looking out for their political future and paints a picture where lobbyists possess an enormous amount of influence over voters or that constituents vote because lobbyists rally them, as opposed to their ideology or point of view. Frankly, it paints a rather grim view of democracy.

Given the Exchange model's portrayal of lobbying and its risks, the focus, the focus of a regulation would be forbidding certain types of exchanges while permitting others. It would define what is a legal exchange and what is an illegal one. For example, Mexico's 2010 lobbying law forbade "the acceptance of any gift, payment or benefit by lawmakers from lobbyists" while permitting political support.

Transmission of Information

The information perspective maintains that "interest groups who have private information on the state of an industry...strategically transmit their information" (You, 2017). This theory not only includes the strategic timing of the transmission of information (Austen-Smith, 1993), it aims to provide a framework to view the facilitation of lobbying. Understanding lobbying as a communication process "enables one to look at it as a sequential process in which the use of different tactics is interrelated" (p.4), (Bruycker, 2014). Sometimes this theory is referred to as

Persuasion theory, however this paper will use the more common name, Transmission of Information.

Interviews with lobbyists (Terry, 2001) demonstrated that lobbyists view their role as supplying “factual and timely information to various audiences” (p.250). According to this theory, lobbyists are merely communications specialists who successfully target their messaging (Wise, 2007) (Terry, 2001). Lobbyists interviewed by Wise (2007) explained that “everything we do in lobbying is information” (p 370). Lobbyists use a multitude of methods to communicate with legislators, bureaucrats, political advisors, demonstrating that strong interpersonal communications skill are integral to the role (Wise, 2007) (Terry, 2001).

However, strong communications skills are not enough. A strong marketing strategy is crucial, but the quality of information transmission is even more important. “Lobbyists are expected to be able to exchange *accurate* information” (p. 370, emphasis added). This is one of the reasons that lobbyists engage in information sharing with other lobbyists and interest groups—it is not only to build coalitions, but is to share information (Wise, 2007).

This is consistent with a theory by Burstein and Hirsch (2007) which maintains that one of the most important things a lobbyist can do is address legislator in committees. This is referred to as the “impact of information.” “Legislators and other elected officials seem especially interested in three types of information”: 1) Importance of the issue at hand—where should the issue rank on their long list of priorities? 2) Information about the impact of the policies—is this proposal effective and what are the externalities? 3) The impact on their constituents—how will this affect their reelection chances?

The information perspective maintains that interest groups relay their information strategically. In this approach, a lobbyist is also anyone trying to influence but the focus is on communication. It does not paint the picture of a quid-pro-quo but rather that of a conversion. This model views lobbyists as storytellers, public relation specialists whose job is to relay the important information in a way that gets the correct message across. If the information is convincing enough, the elected will act in accordance with it. This approach is all about the framing of the information: Lobbyist A relays information B to convince the elected official to support or do C.

The risks of this lobbying as conceived by this approach are type and reliability of the information. Mainly, is the lobbyist providing accurate information, what type of information can be transferred, and the method in which it is relayed. This model is supported through research conducted by Terry (2001) concludes that lobbyists are in fact public relations experts.

The regulation would thus create a framework for communication, define what can and cannot be transmitted, how it can be communicated, and determine a level of transparency required. For example, in order to be able to lobby in the European Union, entities must register and agree to *The Interinstitutional Agreement on the establishment of a common Transparency Register*. This agreement delineates the permitted activities and the types of information lobbying arms are “expected to provide.” The Agreement goes into great detail—there are 13 codes of conduct in total—delineating a lobbyist’s relationship with Parliament. More than half relate to communication: with whom lobbyists can communicate, how lobbyists can communicate, what information can be shared with whom. For example, it is not permitted to provide trade secrets of a particularly company.

Lobbying as a Legislative Subsidy

This theory conceptualizes lobbyists as allies with legislators. They assist with drafting legislation (You, 2017) and they help legislators achieve their goals (Hall & Deardorff, 2006). This theory maintains that lobbyists use different methods, such as media relations and exchanging payments, but that the all-encompassing umbrella remains legislation. Hall and Deardorff (2006) reject the exchange theory, writing that while interest groups may provide campaign contributions, the contributions are not designed to buy voters, but rather “the time or activity of already sympathetic allies” (p. 70). Furthermore, they point to the successes of interest groups that have little or nothing to exchange as gaps in the theory. While Hall and Deardorff (2006) acknowledge that transmission of information is crucial for the field, ultimately there is so many other ways legislators receive information, such as congressional hearings, the news, etc., that lobbyists are hardly the only source—limiting the practical effects of their persuasion. After eliminating the alternative theories, Hall and Deardorff (2006) summarize the legislation subsidy theory as follows:

The main idea is that lobbying is primarily a form of legislative subsidy—a matching grant of costly policy information, political intelligence, and labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators. The proximate objective of this strategy is not to change legislators’ minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives. Their budget constraint thus relaxed by lobbyists’ assistance, already likeminded legislators act as if they were working on behalf of the group when in fact they are working on behalf of themselves (p.69)

Lobbying, therefore, is an attempt to “subsidize the legislative resources of members who already support the cause of the group” (p. 72). According to this theory, since legislators time and resources are limited, they look towards lobbyists to help assist in legislation and media relations. This theory conceptualizes lobbyists essentially as policy specialists. By allying with lobbyists on

various topics, legislators are able to maintain a wider influence on the political process. (Hall & Deardorff, 2006)

The third theory sees lobbyists as an partners with legislators since they help draft legislation (You, 2017) whose main strategy is not to change legislators' minds but to assist natural allies to achieve their goals (Hall & Deardorff, 2006). In this approach, a lobbyist could still be anyone trying to influence an elected and is not sector specific. However, they are more coalition builders than influencers—they are matchmakers who are bringing together likeminded people or entities and coordinating these joint efforts. Proponents of this approach explain that lobbyists' relationships with elected officials mimic that of a service bureau. It builds off of the fact that lobbyists are specialists with an intense amount of knowledge of particular subjects and the time to delve deep, while legislators often do not.

The legislative subsidy has a number of implications. First, lobbyists will only approach those they perceive to be allies and will seldom approach officials whose opinions are not already aligned. Second, it can create pressure on the lobbyists to produce material--such as legislation drafts, speeches, press releases—to support the elected official, similar to any other service provider. This essentially flips the basis of the previous theories: lobbyists are not only pressuring elected officials, but elected officials are pressuring lobbyists.

In line with the approach, regulation would clarify each side's legitimate role and delineate ways they can work together. As mentioned previously, this approach does not exclude elements of the exchange theory or of the transmission of information. It simply maintains that the main focus is lobbyists providing services regarding legislation. An example of the is the U.S Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA). It creates a financial floor that would require any type of organization,

private sector or non-profit, to register their lobbyist(s) if they spend above a certain amount of money on lobbying activities. Any organization that spends more than \$10,000 towards lobbying activities in a six-month period must register the organization and their lobbyists. Firms or consultants whose services include more than one lobbying contact must register and provide immense documentation as well. The other key aspect of this law goes well beyond mere identification. Lobbyists and their respective organizations must submit semi-annual reports which include the names of the organization's lobbyists, information about each "general issues area in which lobbying occurred during the reporting period," and an estimate of the organization's "total lobbying expenditures." However, the main focus of the law is about the overall relationship between lobbyists and elected officials.

The law acknowledges that exchanges may take place and require transparency of financial contributions to campaigns, the law functions under the presumption that legislators and lobbyists are partners and that the focus of their relationship is legislation. It regulates the overall relationship that can be held between lobbyists and elected officials. It is about the totality of the picture as opposed to one focus or another.

Public-Private Interest Lobbying

As mentioned previously, this paper proposes that there are in fact four theoretical frameworks. There is an additional theoretical structure that refers to the dichotomy between public and private interest lobbying. All of the abovementioned frameworks do not focus on the motivations behind the lobbying activities. Instead they focus on the *action* of lobbying itself: how they lobby, what the lobbying entails, what they must do in order to lobby legally. There is no differentiation

between non-profits and commercial entities. This framework, on the other hand, treats the interests of the lobbyists as the underling question. The theory differentiates between *good* lobbyists, those professing to represent the good of the public, and *bad* lobbyists, those representing commercial or business interests. It is not how one lobbies but who can lobby in what way. In this approach, a good lobbyist has different limitations than a bad lobbyist. The problem with this approach is that what is best for the public is very subjective. “The public interest is a much abused as well as downright ambiguous expression” (p.6), writes Berry in his introduction to his magnum opus *Lobbying for the People* (1977). Berry laments that not only is there no clear definition of what constitutes the public interest, scholars don’t even agree on what they are attempting to define. While the idea of the public good remains in debate, *public-interest group* on the other hand is not. Berry defines a public interest group as a group “that seeks a collective good, the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization” (p.7).

This makes public interest lobbying quite clear: It occurs when a group of this kind engages in the act of lobbying. Public interest groups profess to seek societal goods not at the exclusive benefit of their members. Societal goods refer to “any public policy whose benefits may be shared equally by all people, independent of their membership or support of a given group” (p. 8). Examples of public interest groups include NGOs, Non-profits, Think Tanks, etc.

The main risk of this theory is that it is difficult to delineate what organizations are really pursuing the public interests and which are pursuing the merely the interests of their donors. More importantly, there are conflicting views as to what is actually best for the public.

Israel's 2008 lobbying law is the only example to date that differentiates between public interest and private interest lobbying. It perceives the former as a whole-good, non-problematic phenomenon.

Summary of the Typology of the Four Approaches

Table 1 provides a summary of the abovementioned conceptions of lobbying and its regulation.

Theory	Short Summary	What the focus of a regulation would be	Example
Exchange	Lobbyists trade something in exchange for a legislator's help.	The regulation would forbid certain types of exchanges while permitting others.	Mexico Lobbying Law
Transmission of Information	Lobbyists have private information that legislators require, and they strategically transmit their information.	The regulation would create a framework for communication, define what can and cannot be transmitted.	EU Parliament Lobbying Law
Legislative Subsidy	Lobbyists and elected officials are allies who assist each other throughout the legislative process.	The regulation would clarify each side's legitimate role and delineate ways they can work together.	US LDA
Public-Private Interests	The motivations of the lobbyists are important. There are good lobbyists and there are bad lobbyists.	This regulation would create different standards for types of lobbyists.	Israel 2008 lobbying law

It's important to note that regulators can view lobbying in different ways and that regulations in reality may reflect a mix of theories. As explained previously, the empirical focus of the thesis is on testing the consequences of an approach that distinguishes public and non-public lobbying.

Chapter 3: Methodology and History of Lobbying regulation in Israel

The chapter will explain the integrated methodology used to answer the two research questions.

Question 1: What was the institutional logic that underlined Israel's regulation of lobbying?

This question will be via historical analysis of the Knesset legislation documents. These documents were collected via the Knesset Committee website³. The law was proposed by former Member of Knesset (MK) Shelly Yacimovich of the Labor Party on December 3rd 2007. Following the passage of the bill in a preliminary vote on December 19th, 2007, it proceeded to the Knesset Committee for hearings. The documents were all publically available on the committee website.

All 8 committee hearings that discussed this law were analyzed and key points will be addressed. The professed reasons suggested by Members of Knesset in favor and against this law were addressed. The law passed on April 10th, 2008 54-0 in favor of the law.

Hypothesis 1

I hypothesize that institutional logic that underlined Israel's regulation of lobbying is the public-private interest framework.

What were the practical consequences of this institutional logic?

The second question will be answered via statistical analysis of the change in the relative participation of business and NGOs representatives in the hearing of the Knesset Economics Committee before and after the regulation.

The 466 documents included were committee minutes from the Economic Affairs committee of the years 2006 and 2008. There were 172 from 2006 and 294 from 2010. The documents were provided by Knesset Research and Information Center. All of the documents are publically available. Following receiving the documents, a coding scheme counted the number of words in

³ <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawBill.aspx?t=LawReshumot&lawitemid=264251>

each committee hearing by speaker. Then each speaker was coded by type, consisting of Members of Knesset, Government, Individual Businesses, Trade Associations, Professional Associations, Unions, Non-Profits & Institutions, and Unknown or Other.

This work will use descriptive statistics and regression analysis to compare two years' worth of Knesset committee hearings. To gauge the effect of the 2008 law on business lobbying, I systematically coded all 2006 Economic Affairs Committee hearings, that is two years before the passage of the 2008 law, and examined the relative participation of different types of actors compared to other participants in the Committee's discussion. This gives a base line as to what the situation was prior to the 2008 law. Then, I reviewed all of the 2010 Economic Affairs Committee hearings to analyze the impact of the law on the relative participation of the same actors.

The coding categories were based on prior work carried out in the US by Baumgartner and Leech (1998). In their research, the authors distinguish the distribution of lobbying and influence over the legislative process in the United States. In addition to analyzing hearings, Baumgartner and Leech (1998) included documentation published as part of the Lobbying Disclosure act. However, in Israel there is no such documentation and this thesis only focused on the committee hearings. Building off of Baumgartner and Leech (1998), Burstein and Hirsch (2007) maintain that the most important indicator of success is testimony in congressional hearings. Committee hearings essentially test the "impact of information." This thesis takes the committee hearing measurements used by Baumgartner and Leech and then isolated by Burstein and Hirsch (2007) to measure lobbying activities. Committee hearings are where bills are made into laws, it is where those trying to influence the content of the bill speak and push for change. It is the only place where documentation of speakers and the content of is spoken is documented and published in Israel.

Therefore, is the only way to quantitatively measure lobbying activities in Israel, since lobbyists are only regulated inside the Knesset.

The reasoning behind my decision to use Baumgartner and Leech's categories is based on the attention to detail Baumgartner's categories represent. Other researchers would lump businesses together with trade associations and professional associations. While the three are connected, they are not necessarily same, and by combining them, it seemed as if researchers were looking to demonstrate larger corporate influence or make the breakdown more binary.

Employing Baumgartner and Leech's method, I coded the identity of each speaker (e.g., business) and then counted the aggregate number of words by type of speaker at each hearing. Baumgartner and Leech's categories focus on the United States's congressional system. In the original breakdown, they did not include a separate category for Members of Congress, presumably because it was obvious that at Congressional hearings, members of congress speak. However, in order to determine any potential changes, it was important to understand how members of Knesset speak. There is an additional category in this work entitled Members of Knesset. The results are analyzed with and without Members of Knesset to fully grasp any potential changes.

All speakers and the entity they represent were clear. Coding the entity was sometimes clear as well; particularly for the business sector, since the committee hearing minutes would identify them as representing a particular company. If speaker type was unclear, an online search of the entity verified it. Online searches include visiting the entity website as well as understanding their work.

Therefore, categories of types of speakers include:

1. Members of Knesset: Those elected to Israeli Parliament.

2. Government: This includes government officials (but not Members of Knesset) either political appointees or civil servants as well as government organizations such the Department of Welfare Services. This also includes municipal level government officials.
3. Individual Businesses: For profit organizations. This includes companies given a legal monopoly over a service, The Electric Company for example, and those who do not, such as Coca-Cola. Businesses vary in size.
4. Trade Associations: Organizations representing many companies across an industry. Some of these are recognized by the government as industry representatives. In Israel, these organizations often act as quasi regulators—for example, Israel Dairy Board directly influences the production of dairy, since all dairy farms must be in the association.
5. Professional Associations: Represents those engaged in the same profession and usually controls entry into the profession, maintains standards. - for example: The Israeli Bar Association. In Israel, the vast majority of professional associations are recognized are the guards of entry, with the exception being associations of professions not fully recognized in Israel (for example: Physicians Assistants).
6. Unions: Represents Workers. In Israel, most unions are part of The Histadrut (the National Union), although some are not. It is important to note that sometimes in Israel Professional Associations also include unions. For example, the Bar Association also has a union arm. For the purposes of this research, if the speaker represented the union arm, that speaker would be counted as part of the Union category. Additionally, some unions are registered as non-profits (Unions may

legally register as such in Israel). However, since they are unions, I included them in this category throughout and not as non-profits. For example, The Israel Association of Cinema and Television Professionals (ACT) is a registered non-profit but acts solely as a workers' union.

7. Non-Profits & Institutions: All Non-profit Organizations, including academic institutions, non-governmental social/welfare organizations, think-tanks, NGOs, etc.
8. Unknown or Other: This includes any speaker who did not fall into the abovementioned categories. This was typically individual citizens—the number was minor.

Economic Affairs Committee

The Economic Affairs Committee deals with key issues across a large number of sectors. It is one of the busiest committees. Analyzing this committee will demonstrate the effects of the 2008 lobbying law in a pragmatic manner. The Economic Affairs Committee covers the following issues:

Trade and industry, supply and rationing, agriculture and fisheries, all sectors of transportation, cooperative association, economic planning and coordination, development, state concessions and trusteeship over property, the property of absentee Arabs, the property of Jews from enemy states and of Jews who are no longer alive, public works, housing, communications, Israel Land Administration, energy, infrastructure, and water.

The committee has 6 subcommittees but this research only focused on the main committee.

Sample Size

The sample size comprises all 466 committee hearings carried in 2006 and 2010, of which 172 committee hearings took place during 2006 and 294 during 2010.

Regression Models

In order to assess the change in the relative participation of types of speakers in the hearing of the Knesset Economics Committee before and after the regulation, four OLS regression tests are employed. These tests will measure the predicted rate of change to the number of words per hearing as well as the ratio of the words per hearing before and after the reform. The significance of the effect of the regulation (before/after) on the relative participation of different actors is further demonstrated by the following regression analyses. This required the data to be analyzed and the ratio of words by speaker to be compared to the total number of words spoken. There were a total of 3262 observations, which are clustered in 466 Committee. The dependent variable was operationalized in two ways: (a) as the total number of words spoken by actor type (N=416) per hearing (with the overall number of words per hearing as a control variable); (b) as the ratio of the number words spoken by actor type per hearing divided by the total number of words per hearing.

Four OLS regressions analyses, with clustered standard errors at the level of the hearing (N=466), were performed with the above two alternative dependent variables. The independent variables are the category of speaker (Members of Knesset, Government, Individual Businesses, Trade Associations, Professional Associations, Unions, Non-Profits & Institutions, and Unknown or Other.)

Hypothesis 2:

I hypothesize that there was between 2006 and 2010, there was a significant decrease in the number of words spoken per hearing by business interests while there was a significant increase in the number of words spoken by the non-profit and institutions. This change will be reflected in the ratios as well.

Limitations of the Research

By only using quantitative methods, there are elements missing from the analysis of the lobbying industry. Additionally, this research does not take into account lobbying done outside of the Knesset nor does it take into account the relationship with the press or personal relationships. Therefore, this thesis is limited and only focuses on one, albeit important, element of lobbying activities. As mentioned previously, this is primarily a result of the lack of available data.

Chapter 4: The History of Lobbying Regulation in Israel

This chapter focuses on the answering the first research question.

Question 1: What was the institutional logic that underlined Israel's regulation of lobbying?

In 2008, Israel passed a law regulating lobbyists, updating the 1994 law. The updated law requires lobbyists to register in the Knesset, identify themselves of lobbyists when in the Knesset with a special tag, creates a database of lobbyist, and forbids certain behavior. The law defines a lobbyist "A person who, on behalf of a client, engages in the persuading a Member of Knesset in connection with bills and legislation in Knesset or committees, Knesset's decisions and committees, and appointments or election of a person by the Knesset or by a body in which a Knesset representative is a member." It excludes those who

- (1) the person who, within the scope of his work, takes such actions for his employer;
- (2) a person who plays a statutory role in the civil service, in a local authority or in a corporation established by law, even if he does not work, and takes such action within his or her role and in connection with the powers and functions of the body for which he is acting;
- (3) Anyone who represents an officer or plays a role in a quasi-judicial process before the Knesset or a committee of its committees.

The law thus limits the formal identification of lobbyists to those employed by lobbying firms or private companies representing multiple clients. It excludes all in-house lobbyists, regardless of the entity. The law also allows for private sector in-house lobbyists not to register as lobbyists or wear the infamous orange tag as well, but private-sector representatives must identify themselves as a company employee—making their interests transparent. Non-profit organizations do not need to register their representatives nor are they required to delineate their interests, financial or others. A lobbying firm that represents many clients including non-profits would need to register that entity as well, but just a part of a list. The burden does not lie with the organization to register any of their activities, financial or other.

The professed goal of the law was to 1) to provide transparency, since often Members of Knesset did not know if they were speaking to a lobbyist or a private citizen 2) allow all people to make their voice heard regarding all legislations. The proposal noted that “due to the professionalism of lobbying services, the open gates of the Knesset are being exploited to the full by anyone who has a great deal of money to hire the lobbyists.” Members of Knesset seem to directly connect money with influence, but fail to address that organizations hiring unregulated in-house lobbyists may

also have great deals of money (albeit, not going to firms). Following the passes law, hundreds of lobbyists registered with the Knesset.

Prior to 2008, Knesset passed a law in 1994 outlawing lobbyists from bribing politicians or forcing a vote via extortion, threatening or by other dubious means. However, the law did not define a lobbyist nor did it require a registration or any form of identification by the lobbyists. Lobbyists that required to register must provide a list of all their clients. Before 2008, lobbyists and Members of Knesset described the situation as anarchy (Veksler, 2012). Members of Knesset did not know if the person speaking to them were lobbyists or simply concerned citizens, and there were times where Members of Knesset even noted physical aggression directed towards them or their staff prior to the law (Veksler, 2012). In committees, however, lobbyists were identified as lobbyists; Members of Knesset knew who were speaking. Israeli lobbyists not only help draft or table legislation, they have even been involved in coalition talks, such as in 2008, prior to the law being passed (Tal, 2009). While the lobbyists were not acting directly on behalf of their clients and were not paid for this work, it gave them immense access and contacts. In an interview with Veksler (2012), a lobbyist noted that the complexity of the situation: While Members of Knesset “do not need to help the respective clients of the lobbyist,” they “need the information and the feedback from the lobbyist” (p. 273). Members of Knesset wanted a transparency mechanism.

So how did lawmakers understand lobbying? As mentioned previously, the Israeli law views the motivations of lobbyists and the reasons behind the lobbying as the main criteria for defining and regulated lobbying. This can be seen throughout the committee hearings discussing the lobbying law. In 2007 (Knesset House Committee protocol 187, 26/12/2007), Members of Knesset explicitly raised the idea that certain lobbying activities that won't be covered by the law. MK Gideon Sa'ar explained that “there are lobbyists, there are other professionals who are engaged in lobbying

work, and there are those in associations or elsewhere. The third category, in my opinion, is completely irrelevant to our law.” Furthermore, Members of the House Committee explained that this law will help protect weaker communities, since lobbyists represent wealthy private interests. In other words, many members of the committee viewed lobbyists as private corporations who don’t represent the needs of the many but rather those of the few in the top socio-economic classes. Member of Knesset Shelly Yacimovich pushed for the law to be worded in a way to exclude the third-sector organizations since they “truly represent the public interest.” In other words, the regulation is aimed at *bad* lobbyists—those representing private entities who focus on making a profit. All of the House Committee hearings addressing the law point to one common denominator: the motivations behind the lobbying defines the lobbyists, not the act.

Even those committee members who wished to adjust the law to provide a clearer code of conduct for lobbyists wanted to exclude third sector organizations from this limitation. Former Member of Knesset Dov Hanin praised the bill for finding a way to allow non-profit organizations to advance their agendas “without employees of environmental and social organizations being considered lobbyists and subject to the limitations of the bill.” Hanin explained that “there is a clear distinction between those who work for business purposes, to advance particular interests, and those who try to advance the broad public considerations.” In summary, legislators maintained that there are *good* lobbyists and *bad* lobbyists.

Members of Knesset were not focused on the how lobbyists lobby or the actions themselves, but rather the motivations of those attempting to influence elected officials. None of the documents reviewed showed any Member of Knesset expressing any opposition to the lack of limitations on the third sector.

So, what theoretical framework did Israeli lawmaker used? First, it should be noted the ones they didn't and why. Regarding the Exchange Theory, the 1994 law already forbade exchanges of money and support, and the 2008 law did not address exchanges between lobbyists and MKs. However, it did create a different potential exchange: between regulated lobbyists and unregulated third sector lobbyists. The law allows for regulated lobbyists to develop a transactional relationship with the unregulated third sector lobbyists in which lobbying firms would pay or donate to non-profits in exchange for support of the commercial lobbyists' initiatives. Regarding the Transmission of Information theory, the only shift in communication the 2008 developed is the requirement for lobbyists to wear orange tags—a minor change that did not affect the actual work of the lobbyists, regulate the type of communication, or require the communications to be reported on⁴. Regarding the Legislative Subsidy Theory, the law does address lobbyists working on legislation, but by differentiating between types of lobbyists, the law merely shifts the focus of writing and drafting regulations to third-sector organizations (such as research institutes). Therefore, this analysis concludes that Israeli legislators used institutional logic differentiating between public and private interest lobbying. The consequences of this framework will be explained in the upcoming section.

Chapter 5: Empirical Results and Analysis

As discussed in the introduction, there are two research questions. Chapter Four focused on the first, and this section will focus on the second.

⁴ This research does not address the communications or PR strategy of lobbying activities, but some believe that entities attempting to influence Members of Knesset engage in PR more than formal lobbying.

Question 2: What were the practical consequences of the 2008 Israeli law's institutional logic?

As concluded in the previous section, Israel utilizes a different theoretical framework than other countries to understand lobbying and therefore regulates the industry accordingly.

This chapter is split into three parts: 1) Descriptive Statistics, 2) Regression Tests, 3) Discussion of the results. The chapter will conclude that there is a statistically significant difference in the number of words spoken by third sector organizations at the expense of business organizations. The discussion will focus on possible ways in which the regulation affected the results.

Descriptive Statistics

Tables A, B, and C below present the changes in the number of words spoken by type of speaker between the years 2006 (two years prior to the reform) and 2010 (two years after the reform). Table A shows that number of words spoken by type of speaker. Table B shows the percentages of words spoken by each speaker. In 2006, businesses and trade associations accounted for 16.1% of the total words spoken at the Economic committee's hearings. Third-sector organizations represented a mere 2.4% of the total words spoken at the committee hearings in 2006. However, in 2010, businesses and trade associations accounted for 11.3%--dropping 4.8 percentage points or about a 30% decrease. The third sectors increased from 2.4% to 7.2%--a 4.8 percentage point increase which is about a 200% increase. Table C shows the information provided in Table B excluding Members of Knesset and government officials, businesses and trade associations dropped to further highlight the change.

Table A: Total Numbers of Words Spoken in 2006 and 2010 by type of speaker

Year	MK	Government	Business	Trade Association	Professional Association	Union	Non-Profits & Institution	O/Unknown	Total
2006	388060	392179	123448	36641	2659	26284	23668	1976	994915
2010	792738	1075932	211835	57612	5726	61352	172263	8050	2385508

Table B: Percentages of Words Spoken in 2006 and 2010 by type of speaker

Year	MK	Government	Business	Trade Association	Professional Association	Union	Non-Profits & Institution	O/Unknown
2006	39.00%	39.40%	12.40%	3.70%	0.30%	2.60%	2.40%	0.20%
2010,	33.20%	45.10%	8.90%	2.40%	0.20%	2.60%	7.20%	0.30%

Table C: Percentages of Words Spoken in 2006 and 2010 by type of speaker, excluding Members of Knesset and Government actors

Year	Business	Trade Association	Professional Association	Union	Non-Profits & Institution	O/Unknown	Total
2006	57.50%	17.10%	1.20%	12.20%	11.00%	0.90%	100.00%
2010	41.00%	11.10%	1.10%	11.90%	33.30%	1.60%	100.00%

Regression Models

As mentioned in the methodology chapter, there are a total of four OLS Regression tests.

Starting with Table D, Model 1 tested the effect of period (2010 vs. 2006), and actor type (with business as the reference category) on the number of words spoken by actor type per hearing (i.e., committee meeting), holding constant the total number of words during each hearing.

Model 1 compares the combined total number of words spoken by each speaker type with the business category. Controlling for the total number of words during each hearing is equivalent to

controlling for hearing length. Model 2 tested the interaction between the types of speakers before (2006=reference category) and after (2010=category1) the 2008 reformat, again using business as the reference category. Each of the two models tests the ratios of words spoken in 2006 and 2010 by speaker type as well as the total number of words spoken in 2006 and 2010 by speaker type, in order to demonstrate accuracy.

Following each regression model, a prediction table as well as a graph are presented to allow the reader to understand the effects before and after the law in a more visual way. Following the presentation of the results, the significance will be discussed and explained.

Regression Model 1: The ratio of words per speaker per year

Change to ratios of words per actor before and after the reform		
	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Ratio of words	
	(1)	(2)
Year_cat1_after_reform	-0.001 (0.0004)	-0.023** (0.011)
factor(actor_type)gove_rep	0.352*** (0.012)	0.325*** (0.021)
factor(actor_type)member_of_knesset	0.271*** (0.011)	0.283*** (0.017)
factor(actor_type)non_profits	-0.041*** (0.007)	-0.085*** (0.010)
factor(actor_type)professional_associations	-0.089***	-0.103***

	(0.005)	(0.009)
factor(actor_type)trade_associations	-0.064*** (0.006)	-0.070*** (0.012)
factor(actor_type)unions	-0.069*** (0.006)	-0.086*** (0.010)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)gove_rep		0.043* (0.026)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)member_of_knesset		-0.017 (0.022)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)non_profits		0.071*** (0.014)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)professional_associations		0.023** (0.011)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)trade_associations		0.011 (0.014)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)unions		0.027** (0.013)
Constant	0.091*** (0.005)	0.105*** (0.009)
Observations	3,260	3,260
R ²	0.665	0.669
Adjusted R ²	0.664	0.667

Residual Std. Error	0.119 (df = 3252)	0.119 (df = 3246)
F Statistic	921.402*** (df = 7; 3252)	504.074*** (df = 13; 3246)
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table D: Predicted ratio of words per hearing before and after the reform by speaker type

Year_category	Speaker_type	ratio_words
0_before_reform	business	10.5%
1_after_reform	business	8.2%
0_before_reform	gove_rep	43.1%
1_after_reform	gove_rep	45.1%
0_before_reform	member_of_knesset	38.8%
1_after_reform	member_of_knesset	34.7%
0_before_reform	non_profits	2.0%
1_after_reform	non_profits	6.8%
0_before_reform	professional_associations	0.19%
1_after_reform	professional_associations	0.23%
0_before_reform	trade_associations	3.5%
1_after_reform	trade_associations	2.3%
0_before_reform	unions	1.8%
1_after_reform	unions	2.3%

Graph 1: Ratio of number of words spoken before and after the reform by speaker type




Table D and Graph 1 show the effects of the law by demonstrating the rate of change between 2006 and 2008. As can be seen, business participation in the Economic Affairs Committee decreased significantly while non-profit's participation went up drastically.

Regression Model 2: Number of words per actor before and after the reform


Change to number of words per actor before and after the reform		
	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Number of words	
	(1)	(2)
Year_cat1_after_reform	-3.035 (2.142)	-329.534*** (83.432)
factor(actor_type)gove_rep	2,435.675*** (123.776)	1,571.332*** (151.919)
factor(actor_type)member_of_knesset	1,814.410*** (96.266)	1,538.442*** (146.761)
factor(actor_type)non_profits	-299.039*** (58.568)	-580.116*** (72.643)
factor(actor_type)professional_associations	-701.498*** (46.387)	-702.262*** (68.704)
factor(actor_type)trade_associations	-517.232*** (49.312)	-504.692*** (75.732)
factor(actor_type)unions	-529.196*** (50.187)	-564.907*** (76.186)
Total_words	0.143*** (0.0002)	0.143*** (0.0002)

Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)gove_rep		1,367.774*** (226.555)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)member_of_knesset		437.419** (193.003)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)non_profits		445.518*** (108.875)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)professional_associations		1.211 (92.307)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)trade_associations		-19.876 (99.459)
Year_cat1_after_reform:factor(actor_type)unions		56.264 (100.756)
Constant	-313.174*** (43.024)	-107.484* (61.004)
Observations	3,260	3,260
R ²	0.558	0.573
Adjusted R ²	0.557	0.571
Residual Std. Error	1,214.337 (df = 3251)	1,194.477 (df = 3245)
F Statistic	512.487*** (df = 8; 3251)	310.883*** (df = 14; 3245)
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E: Predicted number of words per hearing before and after the reform by speaker type

lobbying_reform	number_of_words (rounded to a whole number)	std.error	conf.low	conf.high	group
0_before_reform	857	91.18223	678.5449	1035.972704	business
1_after_reform	528	69.92307	390.6785	664.7719074	business
0_before_reform	2429	91.44142	2249.369	2607.812274	gove_rep
1_after_reform	3467	69.92307	3329.784	3603.87735	gove_rep
0_before_reform	2396	91.18223	2216.987	2574.414564	member_of_knesset
1_after_reform	2504	69.92307	2366.539	2640.632452	member_of_knesset
0_before_reform	277	91.18223	98.42864	455.8564248	non_profits
1_after_reform	393	69.92307	256.0799	530.173268	non_profits
0_before_reform	155	91.18223	-23.7167	333.711076	professional_associations
1_after_reform	-173	69.92307	-310.373	-36.27911298	professional_associations
0_before_reform	353	91.18223	173.8531	531.2808434	trade_associations
1_after_reform	3	69.92307	-133.89	140.2038802	trade_associations
0_before_reform	292	91.18223	113.6379	471.0657271	unions
1_after_reform	19	70.03476	-118.184	156.3475615	unions

Graph 2: Number of Words Spoken Before and After the Reform by Speaker Type



Model 1 of Table E, in which the dependent variable is measured as the number of words per actor type per hearing, shows that controlling for year (2006 versus 2010) when compared to businesses, non-profits spoke 299.039 words less on average per hearing. Model 2 presents significant interactions ($p < 0.01$) between year (2010 vs. 2006) and actor type. Specifically, model 2 suggests that whereas prior to the reform non-for-profits spoke, on average, 580 words less than business, after the reform the gap between the two actor types was reduced to an average difference of 134 words ($-580 + 446$). As evident also from the regression predictions in Table E, this change is attributed to business' decreased inclination to convey their opinion in 2010 compared to 2006 (-329 words, on average), alongside an increase in non-for-profits inclination to speak ($+116$ words, on average).

An additional shift demonstrated in the tables as a result of the law is the discrepancies between government representatives' participation two years prior and two years following the passage of the law. This thesis did not discuss this topic. However, a possible explanation may include the change in the Knesset Rules of Procedure of 2007 aimed to increase the number of times Ministers and government employees participate as well as increase the preparation time given to the ministries. There is also a decrease in the activities in unions, although to a lesser extent.

Ultimately, the law affected the businesses' inclination to present their opinions in Knesset hearings, while it increased the third sector's lobbying activities.

Discussion

This section will discuss possible explanations for the above shift in the relative talk of business and non-for-profit representatives. It is noteworthy that as public-sector lobbying increased, lobbying by businesses and trade associations declined at almost the same rate. These striking

differences empirically suggest that it non-for-profits may have taken on a new and more prominent role of lobbying on behalf of diverse coalitions. In other words, a new group of unregulated lobbyists has been created following the 2008 lobbying law: third sector lobbying.

So what is the connection between the decrease of business lobbying and the simultaneous increase in third sector lobbying? By not requiring organizations to declare their financial relationship with other entities, the law created the possibility for transactions between for-profit entities and third sector organizations. Third sector organizations can, and in fact do⁵, receive donations from the for-profit sector without declaring it to Knesset. While businesses donating to non-profits is nothing new in Israel (or elsewhere), Israel is unique in that it does not require this relationship to be above board. Furthermore, lobbying firms can (and do) simply register as non-profits and take donations in lieu of direct payments for services. This is the new reality in Israel, and there are numerous examples of this including Lobby99⁶ and OurInteres⁷. If third sector organizations were required to declare their financial relationships to the Knesset or even minimally register as lobbyists, there would be no reason for entities who aim to lobby and receive payment from numerous sources to register as non-profits. The only reason for these types of organizations to register as a non-profit is in order to avoid having to register their clients and therefore their lobbying activities.

By not regulating third sector lobbyists, the law allowed for MKs and formal lobbyists to work with third sector organizations to provide research or other backing in an undocumented way. It allowed commercial interests and regulated lobbyists to support non-profit organizations in an opaque manner. Furthermore, it allows these organizations to claim to represent the public while

⁵ <https://www.idi.org.il/parliaments/11097/11131>

⁶ <https://lobby99.org.il/>

⁷ <https://our-interes.com/our-story/>

receiving support from commercial or business entities. In other words, third sector organizations could easily be brought into broad coalitions and designated to be the main voice without having to register themselves as lobbyists.

Furthermore, lobbying firms have acknowledged on occasion that they often donate to non-profits⁸. However, the exact connection is undeclared and therefore as is the level of unregulated influence third sector organizations truly have. Given that non-profits do not need delineate any financial or other connections to companies, it would be difficult to prove in the scope of this phenomenon. Additionally, the documentation third sector organizations need to provide to the Registrar of Associations does not require detailed delineations of sources of income nor is the documentation publically available. All of these elements combine give the business sector and the third sector able opportunity for an opaque relationship with financial or other commercial interactions.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This paper aimed to illustrate how the lobbying industry has changed following the introduction of the 2008 lobbying law in Israel. Additionally, it offers a different framework for how Israeli legislators view lobbying that differs from other methods. This work demonstrates that by viewing regulating different lobbyists based on their motivations in alternative manners, the Knesset has essentially created an entirely new sub-sector of lobbyists: Third Sector Lobbying. It is clear from this research that current legal criteria do not cover all lobbying activity, and it creates loopholes and mechanisms to bypass the purpose of the law. Third-sector organizations do not need to identify their in-house lobbyists or their lobbying activities, despite the fact that they are attempting

⁸ The most recent example is the current investigation against a Ministers advisor regarding donations to non-profits. <https://www.themarker.com/consumer/.premium-1.9890286>

to influence MKs directly. Due to the specific definition of lobbyists created by the 2008 lobbying, an entirely unregulated sub-sector was developed, making the already impervious system in the Israeli political arena worse. Moreover, and perhaps even more important, the law created an opaquer system than previously. the commercial interests of speakers were always clear for the business sector, as they always represented the financial interests of the entity they represented. The interests of the third sector remained opaque as well, but the participation of third sectors in committees only increased. This made a less transparent system. The current model allows for businesses to donate to third sector organizations and for lobbying firms to simply register as non-profits—both of make the initial exemption of these entities in name of “public interest” meaningless.

The 2008 law was designed in order to increase transparency and give Members of Knesset more knowledge regarding those attempting to influence policy. However, the results paint a different picture—the law required people representing multiple clients to declare that connection, it did not require organizations receiving donations to delineate their interests to the Knesset. Two years prior to law, business participation in hearings represented 12.9% of the words spoken at Economic Affairs Committee, while afterwards they represented only 8.9%. On the other hand, third sector lobbying increased from 2.9% to 7.2% over the course of the same period. When combined with the general lack of transparency in Israel for the third sector, this law darkens the industry even more. The law allows for a transactional relationship between businesses and third sector entities to be unreported, and where lobbying firms will simply register as non-profits in order to hide their lobbying efforts. This ultimately harms Israeli democracy and therefore the citizens of Israel.

This work highlights a new reality in Israel's lobbying arena. It may lead to changes in the Israeli law. There were some discussions in recent years to adjust the law, however those changes were never passed or enacted.

Further Research

As discussed prior, this work only covered the Economic Affairs Committee. Possible further research could focus on other committees and subcommittees to see if the results are consistent across committees. Another possible scope of research could focus on alternative years, such as five years or ten years following the passage of the law. An additional direction could include a qualitative method to measure how lobbyists, from the private and third sectors, work in Israel. Further research could also include analyzing documents from the Registrar of Associations to understand a full picture of commercial contributions to Israel's public sector, but this would require access to privileged information.

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